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CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES FOR
JURIES

Catherine T. Struve*
Abstract
Recent scholarship on constitutional decision
rules distinguishes courts from other constitutional
decision makers, but has not explored distinctions within the judicial institution - between judges and
juries. Correlatively, social science literature on jury
comprehension has proposed methods for improving
jury instructions, but that literature has not
considered in any detail the doctrinal complexities of
constitutional law. This Article, drawing upon both
fields, presents an agenda for crafting constitutional
decision rules specifically for juries. Implementing
this agenda will enhance the adjudication of
constitutional tort claims, and could also render
constitutional doctrine more accessible to non-lawyers.

*
Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am deeply indebted
to the members of the committee to draft model rules for use in civil cases in the
Third Circuit, and to Daniel Capra, my co-reporter on that committee; though
this paper does not necessarily reflect their views, I have benefited a great deal
from their experience and wisdom. I am grateful to participants in a University of
Pennsylvania Law School ad hoc workshop for comments-and especially to
Geoffrey Hazard for detailed suggestions-during the initial stages- of this
project, and to Stephen Burbank, Daniel Capra, Richard Caputo, Dickinson
Debevoise, Frank Goodman, Louis Pollak, Kermit Roosevelt and David Rudovsky
for comments on a draft. I thank Meg Kammerud, Greg Mercer and Dylan
Steinberg for research assistance, and Ronald Day and the. staff of the Biddle
Law Library for assistance in obtaining sources. Errors, of course, are mine.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

When scholars study constitutional interpretation in the
judicial setting, I they ordinarily focus on judges; attention -to the"role .
of juries is much more rare. 2 The emphasis on judges is
understandable. Take, for example, the interpretation- of provisions'
in the Bill of Rights. In most contexts, judicial actors other than
juries interpret and apply those provisions. Magistrates decide
whether to issue warrants. J Trial judges decide whether to exclude
1.
That setting, of course, is not the only one in which constitutional
interpretation occurs. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).
There are notable exceptions. See infra note 29.
2.
Magistrates-unlike jurors-are repeat players in the judicial process;
3.
but it appears that magistrates serving in state court systems need not always
have formal legal training. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth
Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, 889 n.17 (1991) ("Apparently, anyone
who works for the court system but who is not affiliated with the police
department or prosecutor's office can be a magistrate."). Federal magistrate
judges, by contrast, invariably do possess legal training. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1)
(providing that "[n]o individual may be appointed" to a full-time federal
magistrate judge position unless the individual "has been for at least five years a
member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territory of Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Virgin Islands of the
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evidence. 4 Appellate judges review trial judges' decisions. Federal
judges, exercising habeas jurisdiction, review the determinations of
trial and appellate judges (albeit under a deferential standard of
review).5
....
There are, however, instances in which juries playa key role
in the application of the Bill of Rights. 6 A person injUJ;e4 by a·
government actor's violation of the Constitution may sue for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (if the defendant is a state actor) or under the
Bivens doctrine (if the defendant is a federal actor).7 Such a suit
triggers a right to a jury trial,S and though the vast majority of such
United States.").
4.
The Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), that
there must be a judicial determination of the voluntariness of a confession before
evidence of that confession is submitted to the jury, see id. at 388-91. Even if the
judge decides not to suppress the evidence, some jurisdictions permit the
defendant to argue the question of voluntariness to the jury as well. See, e.g.,
N.Y.C.P.L. § 710.70 ("Even though the issue of the admissibility of such evidence
... was determined adversely to the defendant upon motion, the defendant may
adduce trial evidence and otherwise contend that the statement was
involuntarily made .... [T)he court must submit such issue to the jury under
instructions to disregard such evidence upon a finding that the statement was
involuntarily made.").
Rulings in a state criminal trial may also be reviewed by state judges in
5.
postconviction collateral proceedings. See 1 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman,
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 3.5a(6), at 190 (4th ed. 2001)
("All States provide some form of postconviction review ... .n).
6.
In addition to the civil cause of action upon which I focus in the text,
there also exists the possibility of a criminal prosecution for certain federal civil
rights violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
7.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (recognizing an implied right of action for
damages arising from Fourth Amendment violation). The Court has placed a
number of limitations on the Bivens remedy. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
Jurisdiction § 9.1, at 595-604 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that "[i]n the last two
decades, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to expand, and indeed has
substantially limited, the availability of Bivens suits").
8.
See U.S. Const. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ...."). In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), the
Court held that there was a Seventh Amendment right to a jury determination of
the question of liability in a Section 1983 suit seeking damages reflecting just
compensation for a regulatory taking. See id. at 721. Only Justice Scalia would
have held flatly that all Section 1983 claims for damages carry a Seventh
Amendment jury right. See id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment). Both the plurality and the dissent were willing to scrutinize specific
types of constitutional damages claims brought under Section 1983 to discern
whether the particular type of claim triggered a jury right. See id. at 711-12
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cases are disposed of prior to trial,9 the remaining cases constitute a
significant portion of the federal jury trial docket. 10 In those cases (to
take some common examples), I J the plaintiff may claim that a police
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and Thomas, JJ.) (noting
doubts as to whether claim-specific analysis was appropriate but.engagmg in that
analysis anyway); id. at 751-52 (Souter, J., joined by O'Connor, Ginsburg and
Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting Justice Scalia's
proposed approach). None of the Justices, however, questioned the notion that a
Section 1983 damages claim that was tort-like in nature and that sought legal
relief should carry a right to a jury trial. See id. at 709 (majority opinion); id. at
751 (concurrence/dissent). The types of claims discussed in this Article--such as
excessive force claims-would meet this test.
Although the Seventh Amendment does not bind the states, see Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996), a Section 1983 damages
suit in state court will ordinarily trigger a jury trial right under state
constitutional and/or statutory provisions. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
et aI., Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal 998 (9 th ed. 2005) (noting that
most state constitutions include a jury trial guarantee for certain civil cases, and
discussing state statutory provisions concerning jury trial).
Of course, some Section 1983 claims seek only injunctive relief and do not carry
a right to a jury trial. Suits seeking injunctive relief concerning prison conditions
are a notable example. But because the Prison Litigation Reform Act was
designed to make it more difficult to bring such suits for purposes of institutional
reform, damages suits may become relatively more important in prison litigation.
See Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, A Practitioner's Guide to Successful Jury Trials on
Behalf of Prisoner-Plaintiffs, 24 Pace L. Rev. 691, 720 (2004) (arguing that "[tlhe
PLRA is forcing prison reform activists to press for large damage awards as a
vehicle to trigger institutional reform").
For example, a search of case data provided by the Administrative Office
9.
of the U.S. Courts (the "AO Data") reveals that of federal civil rights cases
terminated in fiscal year 1999, 95.94 percent terminated prior to trial. (This
search, which covered all federal districts and all bases of jurisdiction, included
the categories "440 Other Civil Rights" and "550 Prisoner Civil Rights," which are
likely to encompass Bivens actions and Section 1983 actions other than
employment disputes). A similar pattern emerges in other types of cases. For
example, running the same search as described above, but in "all" case categories,
disclosed that of all federal civil cases terminated in fiscal year 1999, 97.70
percent terminated prior to trial.
.
For instance, a search of the AO Data for cases that terminated in
10.
fiscal year 1999 after a completed jury trial showed that 16.68 percent of those
cases fell in the category "440 Other Civil Rights" and 8.43 percent of the cases
fell in the category "550 Prisoner Civil Rights." This search covered -alt federal
districts and all bases of jurisdiction. If the search is narrowed to cases in which
the basis for federal jurisdiction was other than diversity, then the proportions
rise to 25.92 percent (for "440 Other Civil Rights") and 13.15 percent (for "550
Prisoner Civil Rights").
.
11.
Though the AO Data do not provide details on types of constitutional
claims, empirical studies provide an indication of common types of claims. See
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1557, 1571 (2003) ("[Flour
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officer's use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, or that a prison
guard's use of force violated the Eighth; that an arrest transgressed
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement; or that the
denial of medical care to a prisoner constituted cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
What role should the jury play in resolving these claims? At
one extreme, some have suggested that the jury should be the
paradigmatic interpreter and enforcer of the Bill of Rights; 12 perhaps,
under such a view, one could simply give the jury the text of the
relevant Amendment and direct the jury to apply the Amendment to
the facts. 13 At the other, some critics of the jury have argued that the
court should employ a special verdict form, placing only factual
questions before the jury and reserving to the judge the task of
applying the law to those facts. 14
The answer should lie between these poles: the task of
applying the Bill of Rights should not be taken from the jury when
historical facts are in dispute,15 but the jury should apply the

leading topics of correctional conditions litigation in federal court are physical
assaults (by correctional staff or by other inmates), inadequate medical care,
alleged due process violations relating to disciplinary sanctions, and more general
living conditions claims (relating, for example, to nutrition or sanitation).");
Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 550-51 tbls.I & II (1982) (study of case files for all
Section 1983 cases filed in the Central District of California in 1975 or 1976;
common claims included false arrest, assault, battery, shooting, search, and
seizure); Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A
Constitutional Census of the 19905, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 427, 469 tb1.10, 478
tb1.12, 484 tbl. 17,498 tbl. 20 (1997) (study of "a one in ten sample of 1994 federal
district court opinions available on Lexis, a sample that yielded 667
constitutional claims in 431 cases," id. at 451; two of the top four types of
damages claims were Eighth Amendment claims and Fourth Amendment false
arrest claims).
12.
See infra note 29.
13.
See, e.g., George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from
a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 147, 150,
185 (1993) (arguing that "jury panels [sh}ould replace the judge in deciding the
violation issue in pre-trial motions to suppress," and that because simpler
instructions are better, "perhaps the judge should do little more than read the
Fourth Amendment to the jury").
14.
See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in
the Litigation Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 15,90-91
(1990).
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 202-208 for a discussion of whether
constitutional reasonableness issues (in excessive force cases, for example) should
go to the jury when the historical facts are not in dispute.
;

I
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relevant provision as it has been interpreted by the courts. To borrow
a term recently coined by Mitchell Berman, the jury should
implement the relevant constitutional operative proposition, as
defined by the Supreme Court and relevant lower COurtS. 16 Settling
that question, however, merely raises another: what decision rules
should the jury use to determine whether the defendant violated the
relevant operative proposition?
Professor Bennan defines decision rules as "rules that direct
courts how to decide whether a given operative proposition has been,
or will be, complied with.,,17 "Courts," however, are not monolithic
16.
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1,9
(2004) (defining "constitutional operative propositions" as "constitutional
doctrines that represent the judiciary's understanding of the proper meaning of a
constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of provision"). I am grateful to
Matt Adler for suggesting to me that the decision rules literature might be
relevant to the question ofjury instructions.
By "relevant lower courts," I mean the relevant appellate court(s) (for cases tried
in federal court, the relevant Court of Appeals) and the trial judge.
17.
Berman, supra note 16, at 51. Professor Berman offers the following
example:
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[nJo state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." ... Suppose the federal judiciary interprets the
provision to mean that government may not classify
individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a
legitimate state interest. Such, then, is the constitutional
operative proposition. But that is not the whole of judge-made
constitutional doctrine. A court cannot implement this
operative proposition without some sort of procedure (perhaps
implicit) for determining whether to adjudge the operative
proposition satisfied when, as will always be the case, the court
lacks unmediated access to the true fact of the matter. It needs,
that is to say, a constitutional decision rule.
Id. at 9-10. Professor Berman points out that "the decision rule could correspond
to the operative proposition" in a number of "different way[s]." Id. at 11. For
instance,
the Court might direct, as a decision rule, that courts conclude
that the equal protection operative proposition is violated (Le.,
that the state has discriminated among individuals in a
manner not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state-interest) if persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence
either (a) that this is so, or (b) that the challenged action
contains a facial racial classification which is not narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest.
[d. For an insightful recent use of the decision rules model to critique
constitutional doctrine, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:
How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2005).
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entities: s If such rules are written by judges, and are designed
primarily for use by judges, the question arises whether those rules
are appropriate for use by juries. 19
I do not contend that juries should use fundamentally
different decision rules than judges do. 20 But if the premise is that a
jury-applied decision rule should achieve roughly the same effects as
the judge-applied decision rule, then a decision rule designed for
judges may require modification for the jury's use. Must the language
of a controlling Supreme Court decision be read verbatim to the jury,
or can the judge translate that language into more colloquial terms?
If the Supreme Court decision in question emphasizes the need for
deference to the judgment calls made by police officers (or prison
officials), should that admonition be included in the jury
instructions? If the relevant constitutional principle is standard-like
(rather than rule-like), should the judge provide only an abstract
statement of the standard, or should she provide illustrations as
well? Should she attempt to list some or all of the factors that would
bear upon the application of that standard to the facts of the case?
More generally, should she discuss the ways in which the
constitutional principles relate to the events at issue in the case, or
does that overstep the bounds of the judicial role?
In this Article, I contend that the analytical concept ()f
decision rules can help to answer these questions. Using that
concept, and drawing upon the social science literature concerning
jury instructions 2J and decision-making, I set forth a proposed
18.
Darryl Brown has made this point in the context of his perceptive
discussion of decision rules for juries in criminal cases. See Darryl K. Brown,
Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury
Interpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1199, 1206 (1998)
[hereinafter Plain Meaning] ("Although scholars typically consider judges as the
primary audience for these [decision] rules, and prosecutors when they make
charging decisions as a secondary audience, criminal juries also are guided by
these rules.").
19.
Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation,
72 RU. L. Rev. 729, 730 (1992) (pointing out that "it is mistaken to assume that
Supreme Court centered accounts of the principles of constitutional
interpretation are necessarily transferable to the interpretive tasks of other
officials," id.).
20.
Cf. Berman, supra note 16, at 104 (suggesting that "full appreciation of
constitutional decision rules" could lead the Court to "permit Congress to
substitute its judgment for the Court's on just what the applicable decision rule
should be").
There exists a rich literature on jury comprehension and instruction
21.
drafting. See, e.g., Amiram Elwork et al., Making Jury Instructions
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approach for crafting and conveYIng jury decision rules In
constitutional tort cases.
My argument proceeds in four parts_ I begin, in Part II, by
surveying the types of doctrinal challenges that may arise in
constitutional tort litigation. I argue that doctrinal complexity poses
a distinct sort of test for juries-{)ne that demands.. attention to the
choice and presentation of jury decision rules. Part III considers
specific strategies for crafting such rules. I argue in Part lILA. that
jury decision rules should depart from the language of Supreme
Court opinions where such departures improve jury comprehension,
and in Part III.B. that the judge should sometimes assist the jury by .
discussing how the relevant constitutional doctrine may apply to the
facts of the case. Part IV considers the interaction between trial
structure and jury decision rules. In Part IV.A., I argue that reforms
of trial procedures can improve the jury's use of appropriate decision
rules. Part IV.B. considers the division of functions between jury and
judge, giving particular attention to the choice among general
verdicts, special verdicts, and general verdicts accompanied by
interrogatories. Part IV.B. notes that some judicial decision rules, in
particular those governing qualified immunity, need not be imparted
to the jury. Part V concludes.

II. DOCTRINAL COMPLEXITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT TRIALS
A number of scholars-most prominently, Akhil Amar-have
argued that the jury served a central function in the original design.
of the Bill of Rights. Drawing on this history, they suggest that the
jury should once again play a key role in remedying Bill of Rights
violations. They propose that the Court should abandon the
complexity of its current decision rules in favor of simpler rules that
the jury could readily apply. That proposal, however, would require a
drastic break with existing caselaw. This section briefly surveys that
jurisprudence, in order to demonstrate the intricacy of constitutional
tort doctrine. It is highly improbable that the Court would wipe dean
the doctrinal slate, merely in order to simplify. the jury's task.
Understandable (1982); Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal
Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79
Colum.:. L. Rev. 1306, 1323 (1979); Allan Lind & Anthony Partridge, Suggestions
for Improving Juror Understanding of Instructions, in Federal Judicial Center,
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions (1988). Once a decision-maker has settled on
a particular jury decision rule, this literature provides valuable advice for
expressing that rule in language that the jury is more likely to understand.
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Accordingly, any realistic discussion of jury decision rules must
recognize that doctrinal complexities are likely to persist.
Though they "sit on the periphery today," Amar. asserts;
"Gluries stood at the center of the original Bill of Rights."22 For
example, Amar contends that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment
expected "[t]ort law remedies" to provide redress for violati&nsl3 and
suggests that "the Fourth Amendment was designed to privilege the
perspective of the civil jury."24 In the context of Fourth Amendment
violations, as elsewhere, "the key role of the jury was to protect
ordinary individuals against governmental overreaching."25 Amar
posits, however, that after Reconstruction, judges replaced juries as
the optimal interpreters of the Constitution. Where "[t]he original
Bill . . . focused centrally on empowering the people collectively
against government agents following their own agenda[,] [t]he
Fourteenth Amendment . . . focused on protecting minorities against
even responsive, representative, majoritarian government."26 Thus,
Amar suggests, the "natural institutional guardian" of the postReconstruction Bill of Rights may be "an insulated judiciary rather
than the popular jury."27
Amar notes that the task of a founding-era jury would have
been simplified significantly by the relatively straightforward nature
of then-extant doctrine. The "emphasis on juries made all the more
sense in a world where few American judges were deeply and
distinctively learned in law, where common law was relatively simple
rather than intricately regulatory, and where ordinary yeomen were
remarkably literate and rights conscious.,,28 The landscape has
changed dramatically since that time, and the questions facing the
constitutional adjudicator are considerably more intricate. Not
surprisingly, Amar and others who wish to revive the jury's role visa-vis the Bill of Rights also advocate a simplification of constitutional

22.
Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 108-09
(1998).
23.
Akhil Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles
21 (1997) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure First Principles).
24.
Id. at 17.
25.
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131,
1183 (1991) [hereinafter Constitution}.
26.
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Yale L.J. 1193, 1260 (1992).
27.
Amar, Constitution, supra note 25, at 1151 (making this argument with
respect to the First Amendment).
28.
Amar, Creation, supra note 22, at 110.
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doctrine. 29
Simplifying the doctrines that govern constitutional tort
litigation, however, is more easily suggested than doae. The decision
rules concerning the relevant constitutional operative proposition
may be intricate in themselves. 30 Even if they are not, surrounding
liability doctrines may add significant complications-.
It is, of course, a basic requirement of Section 1983 that the
defendant acted under color of state law. 31 In many cases, this
element is undisputed. But where the defendant claims that he was
acting as a private individual, and material fact disputes exist on
this issue, the jury must decide the question. The issues arising in
this context may be as variegated as the facts that can underpin a
finding of state action: 32 was there a "sufficiently close nexus between
29.
See, e.g., Amar, Criminal Procedure First Principles, supra note 23, at
33 (suggesting that "common-sense reasonableness could straighten out Fourth
Amendment thinking and writing"); id. at 40-41 (noting problems posed by
qualified immunity, and advocating the substitution of governmental entity
liability for individual officer liability); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James
T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional- Interpretation: Some Modest
Proposals from the Twenty Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 691 (1995)
(making a "modest" proposal "for restoring The People's role in constitutional
interpretation" that includes "eliminat[ingJ doctrinal jargon in judicial opinions"
and "reinvigorat[ingl the jury as an instrument of popular interpretation of the
Constitution"); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a·
Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 147, 150, 185
(1993) (arguing that "jury panels (shlould replace the judge in deciding the.
violation issue in pre-trial motions to suppress," and that because simpler
instructions are better, "perhaps the judge should do little more than read the
Fourth Amendment to the jury"); cf Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back
into the Fourth Amendment, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 359, 414 (1994) ("The Court's
balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment is better suited to a high level of
abstraction, rather than refined calculations in individual cases.").
30.
I discuss some of those intricacies in Part III, below. Numerous others
exist. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 247, 278 n.160 (1988) (noting "the well-deserved reputation of
Fourth Amendment doctrine for complexity if not incoherence").
31.
A similar requirement exists in Bivens actions. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 UB. 3ff13', 389'.
(1971) (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation "by a federal agent acting
under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages" (emphasis
added».
32.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982)
("[Clonduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment satisfies [Section 1983's] requirement of action under color of state
law.").
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the State" and the defendant's action?33 Did "the State createD the
legal framework governing the conduct"?34 Did the government
"delegatell its authority to the private actor,"35 or "knowingly acceptO
the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior",36 or "provideD
'significant encouragement, either overt or covertm ?37 Did the action
"resultO from the State's exercise of 'coercive power,"?38 Was the
defendant "controlled by" the govemmene 9 or "entwined with
governmental policies"ro Did the defendant "actO with the help of or
in concert with state officials"T 1
To make the issue more concrete, suppose that the defendant
is a police officer who claims that she was off-duty at the time of the
relevant events. If she was off duty, that fact will be relevant to the
determination of action under color of state law42-but the plaintiff
may still show such action if the defendant purported to exercise
official authority.43 Conversely, even if the defendant was on duty,
33.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192
34.
(1988) (citing North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975».
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988».
35.
[d. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
36.
(1961».
Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S.
37.
288,296 (2001) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982».
38.
Brentwood, 531 UB. at 296 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
39.
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (citing Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors
of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230,231 (1957) (per curiam».
40.
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
299,301 (1966».
41.
McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educ.,
24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978».
42.
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 717 (1976) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., and in relevant part by White, J., dissenting) ("[A]n off-duty
policeman's discipline of his own children, for example, would not constitute
conduct 'under color of law.").
43.
See, e.g., Bonenberger v. Plymouth Tp., 132 F.3d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 199'1)
("[O]ff-duty police officers who flash a badge or otherwise purport to exercise
official authority generally act under color of law."). Likewise, even if the
defendant acted for private reasons, she could be considered to act under color of
state law if she used a show of official authority to accomplish her private aims.
See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1965) ("Assuming arguendo
that Scalese's actions were in fact motivated by personal animosity that does not
and cannot place him or his acts outside the scope of Section 1983 if he vented his

670

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[37:659

she still might not have acted under color of state law-if she was
acting for "purely private motives" and if her "interaction with the
victim [wa]s unconnected with [her] execution of official duties.»44
One could express the relevant concept in an abstract form:
did the defendant "exercise power 'possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer.. is. clothed with the
authority of state law'"?"s But in our hypothetical case, application of
this abstract concept could require attention to numerous concrete
faetors: 46 were the defendant's acts job-related?' Did she identify
herself as an officer? Was she wearing police clothing? Did she ~how
a badge? Was she carrying a government-issue weapon or driving a
police car? Did she assert her authority as an officer, for example by
placing someone under arrest?
Now suppose, instead, that the defendant is a private citizen
who-according to the plaintiff-eonspired with a government official
to violate the plaintiffs federal civil rights. 47 The Supreme Court
decisions that recognize this theory of liability do not state in much
detail what the plaintiff must show in order to establish such a
conspiracy.48 But assuming that this theory incorporates standard
conspiracy doctrine, the plaintiff must show an agreement among
some number of people-including the defendant and at least one
government official-to do an act that violated the plaintiffs federal
ill feeling towards Basista ... under color of a policeman's badge.").
44.
Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 24.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v.
45.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
46.
See, e.g., Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809,816 (3d Cir. 1994)
("Manifestations of . . . pretended [official] authority may include flashing a
badge, identifying oneself as a police officer, placing an individual under arrest,
or intervening in a dispute involving others pursuant to a duty imposed by police
department regulations.").
47.
"[T]o act 'under color of state law for § 1983 purposes does not require
that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly
engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are ?cting 'under color' of
law for purposes of § 1983 actions." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)
(citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144;' 152 (1970); United'States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
48.
See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152 ("Although this is a lawsuit against a
priva~e party, not the State or one of its officials, ... petitioner will have made
out a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights and will be entitled to relief
under § 1983 if she can prove that a Kress employee, in the course of
employment, and a Hattiesburg policeman somehow reached an understanding to
deny Miss Adickes service in The Kress store...").

\
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civil rights, and must show at least one overt act in furtherance of
that agreement.49
Even where action under color of state law is undisputed}
multi-defendant cases may present intricate questions concerning
each defendant's liability. In addition to the individual sued for
directly violating the plaintiff's rights, other defendants may be suedon a theory of supervisory liability 50 or for failure to intervene. 51 A
municipality may be sued on the theory that a municipal "policy or
custom" caused the violation of the plaintiffs rights. 52 Showings of
municipal "policy or custom" vary in their complexity: the plaintiff
may point to a duly adopted municipal law, or to a statement by a
policymaking official, or to a custom so widespread and well-settled
that it constitutes the municipality's standard operating procedure,
or to inadequate screening, training or supervision by the
municipality of its employees.
The first of these municipal liability theories is the most
straightforward: the existence of a law authorizing the act in
question suffices to establish municipal policy. 53 With respect to the
49.
See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
50.
A plaintiff can establish supervisory liability by showing that the
supervisor knew of the subordinate's conduct and acquiesced in it. See, e.g., Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A supervisor can also he
liable for inaction, at least where the supervisor displayed "deliberate
indifference to the consequences of inaction." A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne
County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989». In some circuits,
plaintiffs can establish supervisory liability by meeting an apparently less
stringent test, such as "reckless disregard." See Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954,
961 (8th Cir. 1993).
51.
See, e.g., Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) ("IA]
corrections officer's failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis of liability
for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer had a
reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.").
52.
Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
694 (978) ("[llt is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an' entity 'is
responsible under § 1983.").
53.
See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (986) ("No one
has ever doubted ... that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single
decision by its properly constituted legil?lative body-whether or not that body
had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future-because
even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official
government policy.").
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second theory, the judge will determine the identity of the municipal
policymakers, but the jury will still have the task of determining
whether decisions by those policymakers caused the violation of the
plaintiffs rights. 54 As to the third theory, the plaintiff must establish
both "that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force
of law"s5 and that the practice caused the violation. The fourth
theory-'1iability through inaction"56-requires the plaintiff to
establish both that the municipality's failure to screen, train or
supervise amounted to "deliberate indifference" to the plaintiffs.
federal rights 57-a standard the content of which will vary depending
on whether the municipal failure concerned training and
supervision,58 or screening during the hiring processs9-and that the
failure caused the violation.
The varying applicability of official immunity may introduce
yet another complication. Certain types of officials have absolute
immunity from damages claims: prosecutors,60 judges,61 legislators 62
and police officer witnesses 63 are prominent examples. But absolute
54.
"[T]he identification of those officials whose decisions represent the
official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be
resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury." Jett v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
Once those officials who have the power to"make official policy
on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to
determine whether their decisions have caused the deprivation
of rights at issue by policies which affirmatively command that
it occur ..., or by acquiescence in a longstanding practice or
custom which constitutes the "standard operating procedure" of
the local governmental entity ...
[d.
55.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404
(1997).
Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,276 (3d Cir. 2000).
56.
57.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 (1997).
58.
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390.
Where the plaintiff claims "that a single facially lawful hiring decision .
59.
. . launchled] a series of events that ultimately cause[d] a violation of federal
rights ... , rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee." Brown, 520 U.S. at 405; but see id. at 413 n.l ("We do not suggest that
a plaintiff in an inadequate screening case must show a higher degree of
culpability than the 'deliberate indifference' required in Canton . . ,").
60. " See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
61.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
62.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (state legislators);
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (local legislators).
63,
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,345 (1983).
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immunity hinges on the function that the defendant served when
taking the act in question. For instance, a prosecutor's absolute
immunity covers acts taken in "his role as an advocate for the
State,"64 but not acts taken "[w]hen a prosecutor performs the
investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police
officer,,65 or when a prosecutor "provid[es] legal advice to the police.,,66
Thus, although questions of absolute immunity ordinarily will be
determined prior to trial, some defendants may be entitled to
absolute immunity as to some but not all of their actions. If evidence
concerning the conduct covered by absolute immunity is admitted for
some purpose, a limiting instruction may be necessary to explain
which parts of the defendant's conduct may be considered for
purposes of determining liability.
A government official who is not entitled to absolute
immunity will attempt to claim qualified immunity instead. 67 To
determine whether such immunity attaches, the court should first
ask whether "the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right."68 If
so, then the court should consider "whether the right was clearly
established," and in particular, "whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted."69 If these questions can be resolved without confronting
any material disputes of historical fact, the court should rule on
qualified immunity prior to trial. 70 If such factual issues exist,
however, the claim will proceed to trial so that a jury can determine
the facts. Should the jury also decide the issue of qualified immunity?
A full discussion of this issue will await Part IV.B.; in the
meantime, it will suffice to consider briefly the complexity of the
qualified immunity analysis. That analysis requires a determination,
not only of the relevant constitutional principle, but also of whether
that principle was clearly established at the time of the defendant's

64.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
65.
[d.
66.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991).
67.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[GJovernment
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.").
68.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001).
69.
[d. at 201-02.
70.
See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,228 (1991) (per curiam) (qualified
immunity questions "ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial").
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act. Further, the question is not only whether the relevant principle
then existed in the abstract, but also whether that principle's
application to the relevant circumstances would have been clear to a
reasonable officer. In the case of principles that themselves are
stated in terms of reasonableness, the qualified immunity decision
rule is particularly vexing: as commentators have noted, the notion is
that even if the defendant's conduct violated the principle-i.e., the
conduct was unreasonable-this unreasonableness would not have
been clear to a reasonable officer under the circumstances.
Reasonably unreasonable?71
Admittedly, one could eliminate some of these challenges by
simplifying the doctrine. For example, adopting Amar's proposal of
government enterprise liability for constitutional torts72 could obviate
the need to sort through theories of vicarious liability and issues of
official immunity. But such simplifications are unlikely to occur, and,
in any event, a decision rule would still be necessary to determine
whether the underlying operative proposition was violated. As the
following sections discuss, conveying such decision rules to the jury
can be a delicate matter.

III. TAILORING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES FOR USE BY THE
JURY

In a judge's perception, the tapestry of doctrine within which
constitutional operative propositions and decision rules exist will
include many strands: the text of the Constitution; interpretations of
that text, which might take the form of rules or standards; a myriad
of fact patterns to which courts have applied those interpretations in
prior cases; and general background knowledge concerning the
historical context apd development of the Bill of Rights and of private
causes of action for violation of those rights. How much of this
tapestry should a judge display to the jury that hears a civil rights
case? And will the images that a judge perceives in that tapestry be
equally visible to jurors? In Part lIlA., I argue that it is necessary'to
identify the decision rules set forth in caselaw and to ask whether
those decision rules require translation (and/or alteration) for the
jury's benefit. In Part III.B. I ask whether, and how, the court should
71.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) (noting the..
"surface appeal" of plaintiffs' argument that "lilt is not possible ... to say that
one 'reasonably' acted unreasonably," but rejecting that argument).
72.
See Amar, Criminal Procedure First Principles, supra note 23, at 4041.
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assist the jury in applying the relevant decision rule to the case at
hand.
A.

Translating Supreme Court language

There are strong incentives to instruct a jury using the
language found in Supreme Court decisions. Adherence to the
highest Court's language appears to confer a presumption of
correctness on the instructions. 73 Yet that language may not furnish
an appropriate decision rule for the jury. In this subpart, I first
consider language that is not intended to serve as a decision rule for
judges, let alone juries. Next, I consider language that may serve as a
judicial' decision rule, but that is unsuitable for application by
juries. 74 Finally, I consider whether, and how, jury decision rules
should incorporate the Supreme Court's admonitions concerning the
deference due to government actors (such as police officers and prison
officials) whose duties may sometimes require close judgment calls in
high-pressure situations.
For their own decisional purposes, judges may not always
distinguish decision rules from constitutional operative propositions
or from other language in Supreme Court opinions. But the failure to
carefully identify the relevant decision rule can have untoward
consequences.
Take, for example, the decision rule for qualified immunity.75
73.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Gates, 19 Fed. Appx. 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2001)
(unpublished opinion in which majority of panel held that district court did not
abuse discretion in giving deadly force instruction because the "instruction closely
tracks the language used by the Supreme Court in its decision in Tennessee v.
Garner"); Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting challenge
to qualified immunity instruction on the ground that instruction used "language
almost identical to that found in" Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987».
74.
Cf Edward J. Devitt, Ten Practical Suggestions About Federal Jury
Instructions, 38 F.R.D. 75, 76 (1966) (noting that "[alppellate court opinions are
written for a purpose different from that for which jury instructions are
designed").
75.
Qualified immunity doctrine might not strictly be seen as a decision
rule, since it focuses not on identifying violations of constitutional operative'
propositions but on determining whether an official should be subject to suit and
liability for such a violation. However, I characterize immunity doctrine as a
decision rule because the doctrine instructs courts how to determine the effects
that follow from a violation of the relevant operative proposition.
Though qualified immunity doctrine by definition is distinct from the
underlying constitutional operative proposition, David Rudovsky has argued that
because government officials are aware of the existence of immunity, the
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As I discussed in Part II,76 the test for qualified immunity is an
objective one to which the officer's subjective motivations are
irrelevant. 77 The standard, in other words, is what a reasonable
officer would understand the Constitution to require under the
circumstances. The Court's famous observation in Malley v. Briggs
that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law"78 is an accurate description of
the doctrine's effect: if a defendant acted in circumstances under
which a reasonable officer would know the act violated ·the·
Constitution, that defendant must be either inept or malevolent. But
as a statement of how to determine the existence of qualified
immunity, the Malley formula is plainly incorrect: if used as a
decision rule, it would direct the decision-maker to consider whether
the officer knowingly violated the law-precisely the inquiry that the
objective test is meant to rule out. 79 That the Malley turn of phrase
appears in one Circuit's model jury instructions80 (as well as in
instructions given in at least one other Circuit81 ) demonstrates the
immunity decision rule may become a de facto conduct rule for government
officials. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding
Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199, 1221 (arguing that
qualified immunity doctrine "operates . . . to establish a sub-constitutional
standard for future government conduct").
76.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
77.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
Malleyv. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
78.
Admittedly, it could be argued that the Court's reasons for adopting.an.
79.
objective test for qualified immunity no longer apply at the time of trial. The
Court emphasized in Harlow v. Fitzgerald that a subjective standard would lead
to intrusive discovery about the official's state of mind, see 457 U.S. at 817, and
would make it difficult for courts to dismiss cases on qualified immunity grounds
prior to trial, see id. at 818. Once a claim has reached trial, these concerns are
moot. Thus, one could argue that if the jury finds, at trial, that the defendant
actually knew her conduct violated the Constitution, the court could reject the
qualified immunity defense without violating the principles underlying Harlow.
However, it seems unlikely that the Court would approve this approach. Cf
Crawford-EI v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998) ("[AJ defense of qualified
immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant's conduct was
malicious or otherwise improperly motivated.").
80.
See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury instructionS' (Civil)" Itll (2004Y
(instOlcting jury to GOll8ider '.... hether "plaiatiff has ~1'6ved either (1) that the
defendant(s) was (were) plainly incompetent or that (2) he (they) knowingly
violated the law regarding the plaintiff's constitutional rights").
. 81.
See Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62, 70 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The
district court charged the jury: If 'you find from the preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff has proved either, one, that the defendants were
plainly incompetent or, two, they knowingly or with reckless disregard violated
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need for closer attention to the distinction between opinion language
that sets decision rules and language that does not.
Even if language in a Supreme Court opinion sets a decision
rule for judges, there is the further question whether that language
should also form the decision rule for the jury. The Eighth
Amendment standard for excessive force claims by convicted
prisoners provides an example. In such cases, the Supreme Court has
explained that the issue is "whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. "82 Model instructions typically incorporate
this language,8J and courts have approved its use. 84
However, as the drafters of model instructions for use in the
Eighth Circuit have observed, "[t]he term 'sadistic: to some people,
has sexual connotations."8s Though it would be useful to have
empirical data on the way in which jury-eligible people are likely to
interpret the word, it is suggestive that the first definition of
"sadism" listed in commonly used modern dictionaries reflects the
word's sexual associations, while definitions having to do with
cruelty are relegated to second place. 86 Despite this insight, the
drafters of the Eighth Circuit model were constrained by Circuit
precedent. In a prior case (Howard v. Barnett), the Court of Appeals
had ordered a new trial because of the district court's failure to
include the word "sadistically" in the instructions. 87 Accordingly, the
the law regarding the plaintiff's constitutional rights, you must find for the
plaintiff.' Ellison may well be correct that this instruction was erroneous.").
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,6-7 (l992).
82.
83.
See, e.g., Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 10.5 (2004);
Eighth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 4.30; Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury
Instructions (Civil) 11.9; Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 2.3.1;
Kevin F. O'Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice & Instructions Civil § 166.23 (5th
ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004); Martin A Schwartz & George C. Pratt, 4 Section 1983
Litigation: Jury Instructions § 11.01.1 (1997 & Supp. 2002).
84.
See, e.g., Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 & n.13 (3d Cir.
1995) (approving instruction "under the facts of this case").
Eighth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 4.30 n.5.
85.
86.
See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1018 (1977) (defining sadism
as "1: a sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by the infliction of
physical or mental pain on others (as on a love object) ... 2 a : delight in cruelty b
; excessive cruelty"); The American Heritage College Dictionary 1199 (3d ed.
1993) (defming sadism as "1. Psychol. a. Sexual gratification from infliction of
pain on others. b. A psychological disorder in which sexual gratification is derived
from infliction of pain on others. 2. Delight in cruelty. 3. Extreme cruelty").
87.
See Eighth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 4.30 n.5 (citing
Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868 (8th Cir.1994). In Howard, the Court of Appeals
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Eight Circuit model includes the word "sadistic" in the instruction,
but advises that the term should be defined for the jury.88
The outcome in Howard could haYe been justified on other
grounds;89 it is thus particularly unfortunate that the rationale
stressed by the Court of Appeals-that "the fact-finder may not
conclude that the Eighth Amendment was violated unless it finds that the force was applied 'maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm,..90-seems to require the incantation of the
quoted language. The Eighth Circuit has since approved theapproach, taken in the model instructions, of defining the word
"sadistic" for the jury.91 The addition of a definition is .helpful, andmay suffice to prevent jury confusion. But it would be better still to
omit the misleading word, and instead to use other, more
straightforward language to convey the relevant concept. 92
The Eighth Amendment excessive force standard illustrates a
related question, as well: in addition to conveying the basic decision
rule set by the Supreme Court, should jury instructions also echo the
relied both on the notion that '''maliciously' and 'sadistically' have different
meanings, and the two together establish a higher level of intent than would
either alone," and on the assertion that by omitting the word "sadistically," the
instruction deviated from the standard "required by the Supreme Court· in
Hudson." Howard, 21 F.3d at 872.
88.
See Eighth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 4.30 n.5.
(advocating use of definition); id. § 4.46 (defining "sadistically" as "engaging in
'extreme or excessive cruelty or delighting in cruelty''').
89.
See Howard, 21 F.3d at 872 (noting "[mloreover" that the instruction
was also "defective because it told the jury that the presence of malicious
behavior was merely a factor for the jury to consider, rather than the jury's
pivotal inquiry").
90.
[d. at 872.
In Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232 (8th Cir. 1998), a different Eighth
91.
Circuit panel rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge had erred by
defining "sadistic" for the jury. As the court explained,
Although district courts are not required to define words that
are in the vocabularies of lay persons, the meaning of
'maliciously' and 'sadistically' is critical to a jury's deliberations
in this type of case. We cannot say the district court abused its
discretion when it used the definition- of "sadistically'" we
mentioned in Howard, 21 F.3d at 872, to help explain the
culpable mind-set required by Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
..Parkus, 135 F.3d at 1234.
For example, the Howard court defined "sadistically," in its opinion, as
92.
"engaging in extreme or excessive cruelty or ... delighting in cruelty." Howard,
21 F.3d at 872. Such language could be used as a substitute for, rather than a
definition of, "sadistically."

2006]

DECISION RULES FOR JURIES

679

tenor of the surrounding language in the relevant opinion? In Whitley
v. Albers, the Court adopted the "malicious arid sadistic" decision rule
for use in cases arising from prison riotS. 93 In Hudson v. McMillian,
the Court extended that decision rule to all excessive force claims by
convicted prisoners. 94 The Court explained this extension by
asserting that "[m]any of the concerns underlying [the] holding in
Whitley arise whenever guards use force to keep order":9j
Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser
disruption, corrections officers must balance the need "to
maintain or restore discipline" through force against the
risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require
prison officials to act quickly and decisively. Likewise, both
implicate the principle that "(p]rison administrators . . .
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security. "96

Read in context, these words explain the Court's choice of
decision rule, but need not be seen as a part of that decision rule.
However, some sets of model instructions-apparently intent on
incorporating Supreme Court language-include not only the
malicious and sadistic standard but also an admonition concerning
the need for deference to official judgments. 97 Thus, for example, the
Fifth Circuit model instruction warns: "I remind you that you must
give prison officials wide ranging deference in the adoption and
93.

See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,6-7 (1986) (holding that Whitley
standard applies "whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive
physical force in violation ofthe Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause").
95.
ld. at 6.
96.
ld.. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). Later in the opinion, the
Court made a similar allusion to the need for deference when explaining why de
minimis uses of force may not violate the Eighth Amendment: "'Not every push or
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,
violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.''' Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
In addition to the instructions quoted in the text, see also O'Malley et
97.
aI., supra note 83, § 166.23 ("[YJou must give prison officials -wide rangiag.
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
internal security in the prison."); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions
(Civil) 2.3.1 ("[N]ot every push or shove, even if it later seems unnecessary, will
give rise to a constitutional violation; and an officer always has the right, and the
duty, to use such reasonable force as is necessary under the circumstances to
maintain order and assure compliance with prison regulations.").
94.
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execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain internal
security in the prison."9g Likewise, the Ninth Circuit Inodel
instruction informs jurors that "you should give deference to prison
officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain
internal security in a prison. "99

In effect, these instructions double-count the need for
deference. That need has already been taken into account in the
Court's choice of the malicious and sadistic standard (rather than
some other standard that would be easier to meet).loo To add explicit
admonitions concerning the need for deference risks tipping the
scales yet further in the defendant's favor. tol
By contrast, the Supreme Court's discussion of the Fourth
Amendment standard for excessive force suggests that the Court's
chosen decision rule for that standard might incorporate a reference
to some notion of deference. In Graham v. Connor, the Court held
that all excessive force claims arising from arrests, police stops and
other such seizures "should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard.",02 The Court framed
the reasonableness analysis as a balancing of the individual's
"Fourth Amendment interests" against the government's. law
enforcement interest. 103 Noting that the analysis must be factspecific,I04 the Court proceeded:
98.
Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 10.5.
Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 11.9.
99.
For example, Justice Stevens argu~d in Hudson that the Court should
100.
instead apply "the less demanding standard of 'unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain."' Hudson, 503 U.S. at 13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
101.
As the Third Circuit has recognized, the decision rule's distinction
between malicious and sadistic uses of force (on one hand) and good faith efforts
at discipline (on the other) suffices to convey the notion that prison officials
should be given latitude: "If 'force was applied in a good faith effort to maintairi or
restore discipline,' ... the jury presumably would conclude that although the use
of force was excessive, it was still justified given the circumstances." Douglas v.
Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1233 (3d Cir. 1995).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
102.
103.
See id. at 396.
104.
See ro. (stating that "proper application" of the standard "requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight").
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The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight ....
uNot every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments-in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force
. necessary III
. a part'lC ul ar 51'tuat'IOn. 105
t h at IS

This discussion seems clearly to concern the content of the
decision rule, rather than the Court's reasons for selecting it. The
reasonableness analysis, under this view, must incorporate the fact
that police must sometimes react instantly in high-pressure
situations~ without that recognition, the analysis could err. One could
take issue with the Court's reasoning,106 but it is difficult to deny that
Graham's deference discussion sets a decision rule.
Of course, recognizing the Graham language as a decision
rule does not demonstrate that it ought to be used verbatim to
provide a decision rule for juries. Presumably, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote at least partly with lower court judges in mind.
After all, those judges must apply the Graham standard when
deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions for
summary judgment, and motions for judgment as a matter of law.
Indeed, in the light of the fact that the vast majority of federal civil
rights claims are dismissed prior to trial,107 it will usually be a judge
who employs a decision rule to dispose of the case. Admittedly, in
order to dispose of the case without trial, the judge must ask whether
any reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. lOB But this
does not mean that the decision rule employed by the judge must be

105.
ld. at 396-97 (emphases added) (quoting Jolmson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.n.
106.
For example, one could argue that municipalities, at any rate, should
carefully train officers to respond appropriately in just such situations, and that
it is therefore inappropriate to give undue weight to such exigencies when
assessing who should bear the cost when things go wrong (at least in the context
of assessing municipal liability).
107.
See supra note 9.
108.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
("[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.").

682

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW

[37:659

worded in the same way as the decision rule for a jury.
To determine whether, and how, to include the Graham
language in a jury decision rule, it would be useful to know how
juries' analysis of the relevant issues would likely compare with
judges'. For example, one might want to know whether juries are
more or less likely than judges to be affected by hindsight bias, 109 .and.
whether juries are more or less likely than judges to defer to the
judgment of police officers. If juries are no more likely than judges to
defer to police judgments, then the jury decision rule might employ a
good deal of the language used by the Graham Court. If, on the other
hand, juries are already more predisposed to defer, the jury decision
rule might appropriately encapsulate the deference concept simply by
saying that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.,,11O
As the foregoing illustrates, isolating decision rules from the
surrounding discussion in Supreme Court opinIons will not fully
determine how the jury decision rule should be worded. Should more
accessible terms be substituted for those that might be misleading?
Should the level of emphasis placed on a concept such as deference to
police judgments vary as between judges' and juries' decision rules?
Experimental or field studies could help instruction drafters to select
among possible jury decision rules. The analytical steps discussed in
this Part can identify questions for such studies to address-or, in
the absence of such studies, can at least make clearer the
assumptions that underlie the current selection of decision rules.

109.
On the question of hindsight bias In judges' decisionmaking, see, e.g.,
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 804 (2001)
(discussing experimental data); Stuntz, supra note 3, at 912-13 (discussing role of
hindsight bias in judges' decisions on suppression motions). For a description of
experiments the results of which provide evidence of possible hindsight bias in
mock jurors, see Casper & Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information and
Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in Inside the
Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
no. Studies of jurors' and juries' views of the police could also help
instruction drafters to determine whether jUlY decision rnles- should includemr
instruction on police officers as witnesses. See, e.g., Michael Avery et al., Police
Misconduct: Law and Litigation § 12:8 (providing such an instruction). Similar
studies ofjurors' views of prisoner plaintiffs and correctional defendants would be
useful as well. Cf. Gerhardstein, supra note 8, at 692 ("Jurors hate prisoners.
Most are shocked to learn that prisoners have the right to sue corrections officials
and even more shocked to learn that they will be asked to award damages to
those prisoners.").
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Fitting the decision rules to the case

The prior section discussed the challenges inherent in
deriving jury decision rules from Supreme Court opinions. But even
assuming the success of that enterprise, no set of jury decision rules
can be perfected in the abstract. Though the appeal of model
instructions is understandable-following models, like repeating the
language of Supreme Court decisions, can in effect lend a patina of
correctness to a trial judge's instructionsIII-the authoritativeness of
models should not be overestimated. Model instructions can no more
determine the content of a good set of jury instructions in a given
case than the teacher's manuals that accompany some law school
casebooks can provide a script for competent teaching. The model
gives a framework and a working draft, but it may require
adjustment to fit the case at hand. t12
In this Part, I discuss several types of tailoring that may be
needed. I begin by discussing the challenges posed in crafting a
decision rule concerning the "totality of the circumstances." I contend
that to instruct on such a decision rule, the court should not merely
provide an abstract formulation but should also point out the types of
factors that the jury should consider. Next, I stress the need for
discernment in selecting an existing decision rule for application in a
111.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting defendants' challenges to jury instructions and noting that trial judge
"used the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instruction, substantially verbatim");
Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting challenge
to jury instructions on the ground that the instructions "adequately included [the
requisite] elements and mirrored the Ninth Circuit model civil jury instruction
for disparate treatment under Title VII, which is analogous for purposes of this
analysis"); see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to
Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on
Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 162 (1988) ("Judges know that use of dry,
generic form charges copied from chargebooks reduces the risk that they will be
reversed."); Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient
Jury Instructions, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (2000) ("For rules on which an
instruction has been approved on appeal or by a pattern jury instruction
committee, trial judges often will not even hear argument for alternatives.").
112.
See Devitt, supra note 74, at 77 ("Very few pattern instructions are
intended to be copied verbatiin in every case. They are intended principally as an
aid to the preparation of an appropriate instruction in the particular case.");
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 583 (1991)
("Lawyers and judges can greatly aid jury comprehension by drafting instructions
in plain English, tailoring them to the facts of the case, avoiding broad
generalizations that make their application more difficult, and providing the jury
with decision trees or algorithms to follow in their deliberations.").
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given case. In some instances, the Supreme Court has adopted a
standard-like decision rule, but has then derived a more specific and
rule-like formulation for use in certain circumstances; I note that in
such cases, the more specific decision rule should be employed when
warranted by the evidence. In other instances, a decision rule
employed in one type of case may be misleading when used in a
related, but materially distinct, type of case. Finally, I consider cases
in which the trial court provided the jury with an otherwise
unexceptionable decision rule, but failed to tailor. that rule, to
important facets of the case.
The Fourth Amendment standard for excessive force pro.v:ides
some pertinent examples. As I discussed above, this is an objective
reasonableness standard of sorts. The analysis proceeds from the
viewpoint of a reasonable officer (though that viewpoint should be
applied to the facts the defendant reasonably believed to be true at
the time)I13-but the objectivity of the analysis, under the Graham
formulation, apparently should be colored by a recognition of the
challenges of police work under high-pressure conditions. 114 In any
event, the key point for present purposes is that the standard is one
of all-things-considered reasonableness. It "requires careful attention
to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight." I 15 Lower courts have noted other factors that may be relevant,
such as "the number of persons with whom the police officers must
contend at one time."116

113.
See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001) ("If an officer
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back ...
the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.");
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 516-17 (3d Cir. 2003) (analyzing
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim based on officers' knowledge or
"objectively reasonable belief' concerning relevant facts); Curley v. IDem, 29'8
F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that, viewed in light most favorable to
plaintiff, evidence established excessive force because "under [plaintiffl's account
of events, it was unreasonable for [defendant] to fire at [plaintifflbasmt on hiS'
unfounded, mistaken conclusion that [plaintiff} was the suspect in question").
114.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-110. As I discuss in Part
'lII.A., if jurors possess an intuitive sense of those challenges, the decision rule
need not contain as great an emphasis on the matter as it would if jurors were
likely to be unaware of such challenges.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
115.
116.
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004).
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How should the court direct the jury's "careful attention" to
the "circumstances of [the] particular case"? At a minimum, of
course, the court must provide the abstract statement of the decision
rule. In addition, the court should give examples of factors that may
be most relevant to the analysis. l17 Thus, some model instructions
include, as examples, the factors identified by the Court in
Graham. 118 If other factors-not identified in Graham-are also
relevant, the court should list those too. The listing of factors in a
model instruction should be a starting point; working in consultation
with counsel, the court should add any other factors warranted by
the evidence. 1l9
Some might object that it suffices to list the Graham factors,
and that listing others requires judgment calls that put the judge in
the position of commenting on the evidence. The Graham Court, of
course, made clear that its listing was not exhaustive. 120 More
centrally, as the discussion that follows will illustrate, in order to
craft appropriate instructions, the court must make judgment calls
about the legal implications of the evidence in the case.
Take, for example, the choice of decision rules in a case
involving the use of deadly force by a police officer. In most Fourth
Amendment excessive force cases, as I have noted, the standard-like
decision rule directs the jury to balance the individual's Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure against the
government's law enforcement interest, using a totality-of-thecircumstances approach. Technically, that balancing also applies in
cases where the force used was deadly in nature, but in such cases
the Supreme Court has performed the balancing itself, producing a
somewhat more rule-like decision rule. Reasoning that "[w]here the
suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
117.
Cf. John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty
Pleas to Aid Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1187, 1252
(2002) (criticizing pattern jury instructions for "present[ing concepts] in an
abstract manner").
The court should make clear that the list of factors is not exhaustive. Cf Seventh
Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 7.09 cmt. (cautioning that a list of
factors "might suggest that others are irrelevant").
118.
See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 11.4;
Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 2.2.
119.
The court should list. these factors in the final instructions; if the
judge gives preliminary instructions at the outset of the trial, those instructions
can simply state the general standard. See infra text accompanying notes 167172.
120.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not
justify the use of deadly force to do SO,"121 the Court held in Tennessee
v. Garner that deadly force may not be used "to prevent the escape of
an apparently unarmed suspected felon .... unless it is necessary to
prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury to the officer or others. nI22' Even if this test is met, the officer
must, if feasible, give the suspect a warning before using deadly
force. 123
In cases where the evidence indisputably shows a use of
deadly force,124 the court must draw the jury's decision rule from
Garner rather than Graham. 125 To do otherwise would invite the jury
to choose a balance other than that selected by the Garner Court. 126
The Garner/Graham choice, then, illustrates one of the trial judge's
basic tasks: she must assess the evidence and determine whether the
Supreme Court (or the relevant Court of Appeals) has prescribed a
decision rule for the particular type of dispute involved in the case.

121.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
122.
[d. at 3.
123.
See id. at 11-12.
. 124.
If there are disputes of material fact as to whether or not deadly-Jorce
was used, then the court should instruct on both the Garner and Graham tests
and explain when each applies.
The Garner Court did not specify what types of force, other than shootings,
count as deadly force for Garner's purposes.. See generally Michael Avery et al.,
Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation § 2.22 ("The use of instrumentalities other
than firearms may constitute the deployment of deadly force. Police cars have
been held to be instruments of deadly force. A majority of the courts that have
considered the question and have concluded that police dogs should not be
considered an instrument of deadly force.").
125.
The Garner decision rule requires adjustment for use in cases where
the suspect is not trying to escape but nonetheless poses a threat to someone's
safety. See, e.g., Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 7.09 (Gamer
instruction providing that "[a]n officer may use deadly force when a reasonable
officer, under the same circumstances, would believe that the suspect's actions
placed him or others in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm").
126.
See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Phoenix; 24& F.3d·S5l:, 86tH9thCir. 2t)t}tJ
(holding that "in a police shooting case such as this, where there was no dispute
that deadly force was used, the district court abuses its discretion by not giving a
Gamer deadly force instruction"); but see Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d
990,995 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002) (in case where trial court gave both an excessive force
instruction and a deadly force instruction, holding that "[a]lthough the inclusion
of both instructions was improper and created confusion, it does not constitute
plain eTTor").
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When the caselaw provides such a decision rule, the trial judge must
make sure to provide it to the jury.
If this exhausted the responsibilities of the trial judge, the
task might be relatively straightforward: she must merely make sure
to select the appropriate decision rule from among those provided by
the higher courts. But some cases may present disputes for which no
higher court has yet explicitly provided a decision rule. In those
cases, there is no recourse to models, for no model exists; and the
unthinking use of a model developed for some other type of case may
seriously mislead the jury.

The Eighth Amendment "excessive force" instruction given in
Giron v. Corrections Corporation of America provides a notable
illustration. 127 The plaintiff, claiming that a corrections officer raped
her while she was imprisoned in a state correctional facility, brought
Eighth Amendment claims against the officer and other
defendants. 12g Plaintiffs counsel apparently styled the claim against
the officer as one for excessive force; but recognizing the distinctive
issues posed by an "excessive force" claim stemming from a rape,
plaintiffs counsel requested the following instruction:
Sexual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections officer has no
legitimate purpose, and is simply not part of the penalty
that prisoners must pay. If you find that Defendant Torrez
forced Plaintiff to have sexual intercourse with him, then
you must find that this use of force was excessive and
applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
. h arm. 129
causmg

The district court, however, rejected this language, and
instead instructed the jury that in order to return a verdict for the
plaintiff it must find:
First: that Defendant Torrez forced Plaintiff to have sexual
intercourse with him; and
Second: that the use of force was applied maliciously and
for the very purpose of causing harm; and
Third: as a direct result, Plaintiff was damaged .... 130

As we saw in Part IILA., a "malicious and sadistic" standard

127.

191 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999)

128.

[d. at 1288. The Eighth Amendment claims were asserted under

Section 1983; the plaintiff also asserted claims under state law. [d. at 1284.
129.
[d. at 1288.
130.
[d. The instructions also included the requirement of action under
color of state law. See id.
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governs prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force.
Indeed, the Court has stated explicitly that this standard applies
''whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical
force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."131
But neither Whitley v. Albers (in which the Court first adopted the
"malicious and sadistic" language)132 nor Hudson v. McMillian (in
which the Court extended that language to all excessive force
claims)133 involved a claim of rape.
In a case where the plaintiff claims she was beaten and the
defendant admits the use of force but claims it was necessary to
maintain order, the Court's "malicious and sadistic" standard·can·be
coherently applied: Assuming the jury finds that the officer used
force, the jury must still determine whether the officer's motives
were malice and sadism (rather than a "good faith effort" to keep
order). But in a case where the plaintiff claims she was raped,134 it
makes no sense to require the plaintiff to prove both the rape and the
defendant's malice and intent to cause harm. Such an instruction
defies logic (and basic decency), for it suggests that some rapes of
inmates by guards are constitutionally permitted-that in order to
find for the plaintiff the jury must find not only that the rape
occurred but also something more. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
found plain error in the instruction and remanded the claim for a
new trial. 135
The problem in Giron, then, was the trial judge's failure to
recognize that the Whitley IHudson decision rule for excessive force
claims simply was unsuitable for adjudicating Ms. Giron's claim. A
different issue may arise when the court employs an otherwise
appropriate decision rule but fails to explain to the jury how that
decision rule might be applied to the case at hand. Grazier ex rel.
White v. City of Philadelphia illustrates how the need for such

131.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,6-7 (1986).
132.
See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,320-21 (1986).
133.
See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
134.
In Giron, the defendant asserted that "consensual" sex occurred. 191
F.3d at 1284; compare Heggenmiller v. Edna MahanCurrectional'lnstitution for
Women, 128 Fed.Appx. 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2005) (non-precedential opinion)
(Fuentes, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven defendants concede that prison inmates cannot
legally consent to sex with their prison guards.").
• 135.
See id. at 1290 ("Since Ms. Giron had to prove that Mr. Torrez forced
her to have sex with him, she should not have faced the additional hurdle of
showing that the coercion involved malice under a test primarily designed for a
prison guard's use offorce to maintain order.")..
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additional ,commentary might arise. 136 As described in the appellate
opinions in Grazier, the facts of the case were these: two rookie police
officers, in plain clothes and an unmarked car, stopped a car for a
traffic infraction by pulling in front of it at a right angle. The officers
claimed they showed badges and said "Police, Don't move"; the driver
of the car claimed he had the windows up and the radio on, and
thought the two men were carjackers.
Panicked, [Campbell] threw his car into reverse and backed
into another car. He then drove forward either at Hood or
in his direction. Hood fired four shots at Campbell's car,
three of which struck CampbelL The shot that injured
Campbell most severely, the last of the four, arguably was
not discharged until after his vehicle was pulling away from
137
the officers.

The trial judge gave the jury a standard Graham
reasonableness instruction on excessive force,138 as well as a more
specific instruction on deadly force. 139 Thus instructed, the jury
returned a verdict for the defendants. 14o On appeal, the plaintiffs
contended that "the Court should have instructed the jury that an
officer acts unreasonably if his improper conduct creates the
I

i

,

I
I

If

1

136.
137.
138.

328 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2003).
ld. at 123.
The instruction read in part:
[YJou must determine whether the amount of force used to
effect the stop was that which a reasonable officer would have
employed in effectuating the stop under similar circumstances.
In making this determination, you may take into account the
reason for the stop, the severity of the crime or the violation,
whether plaintiffs posed an immediate threat to the safety of
the defendants or others, and whether the plaintiffs actively
resisted or attempted to evade the stop.
ld. at 126 n.7.
This part ofthe instruction stated:
139.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the use of force in this
situation, you must ask yourselves the following question:
giving due regard to the pressures faced by the police, was it
objectionably [sic] reasonable for the officer to believe, in light
of the totality of the circumstances, that the subject posed a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others, and that deadly force was necessary to
prevent the suspect from cauf?ing serious physical injury or
death.
ld. at 130 (Becker, C.J., dissenting in part).
140.
See id. at 122.

690

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[37:659

situation making necessary the use of deadly force."'41 A majority of
the appellate panel rejected the plaintiffs' argument, finding that
they had not requested their desired instruction and that the failure
to give it was not plain error. 142
Then-Chief Judge Becker dissented in relevant part. In his
view, the trial judge should have explained that if an~o:fficer's.
conduct unreasonably creates the need to use deadly force in selfdefense, that conduct may render the eventual use of deadly force by
the officer unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even
if the officer reasonably believed that such force was necessary to
prevent death or severe bodily injury."143 In addition, he argued, the
trial judge should have marshaled the facts for the jury, pointing out
"that the defendants were plain-clothes officers, forbidden by
Regulations to make traffic stops, and that the officers were driving
an unmarked car (in a high crime neighborhood) which they pulled
perpendicularly in front of plaintiffs' car to make a traffic stop, also
in violation of department policy."144 And the judge should have
drawn the jury's attention to key fact disputes, such as ''whether the
officers exited the car with guns drawn and failed to identify
themselves," and "whether a reasonable officer in Hood's position
would know that he was out of danger when he fired the last shot,
which entered the back of Campbell's car and lodged in the base of
his brain."145
To both the majority and dissent in Grazier, this dispute over
the decision rule was at its core a disagreement over the proper role
of the trial judge. The majority asserted that the dissent's approach
would impinge on both counsel and jury: "[E]ngrafting evidence to
argument is the home turf of counsel. Laying out a level (even if
plain) canvas for counsel to color is the court's model role."'46 Chief
Judge Becker responded that, to the contrary, the trial judge has a
duty to relate the law to the facts: "The art of instructing the jury is
not the rote recitation of controlling legal principles, quoted verbatim
from the case law, but the didactic exercise of providing the jury with
guidance as to how those principles apply to the evidence presented
Id. at 127.
Id.
143.
Id. at 129-30 (Becker, C.J., dissenting in part).
14;4.
Id. at 131.
145.
Id. Unrebutted expert testimony indicated that the last shot was
fired, through the back windshield into the plaintiffs head, when the plaintiffs
car was between 32 and 120 feet from the defendant, heading away.
146.
Id. at 128.
141.

142.

2006]

DECISION RULES FOR JURIES

691

and how the factual disputes bear on the ultimate outcome."147
These contrasting views fit within a long-running debate over
judicial comment on the evidence. 148 "Judicial comment" is a broad
term; such comment can range from a summary of the evidence (and
its connection to relevant law) to observations concerning witness
credibility and the weight of the evidence. At least the latter sorts of
comment are now outlawed in a majority of states;149 but federal
judges retain a broad discretionary power to comment. Judge
Weinstein has argued that judicial comment can "educate the jurors"
and "can serve to clarify what may have been distorted by the bias of
counsel's arguments."ISO Judge Weinstein observes that "stat[ing] the
rules of law in the context of the evidence" is the most common
method of judicial summary of the evidence: "The judge may simply
state the rules of law in the jury charge, and illuminate them with
examples from the evidence presented in the case."ISI Like Chief
Judge Becker, Judge Weinstein considers such a summary to be
necessary in some cases; "[mlere abstract statements of general rules
from the chargebooks may leave all but the most sophisticated and
quick-witted jurors without any effective guidance."152
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The notion that the judge should provide such comment in
appropriate cases reflects a particular view of the relationship
between judge and jury. In this model, the trial serves as a sort of
seminar on the relevant issues, and the judge plays the role of a
teacher-as should the lawyers. 153 Indeed, as the Grazier majority
."):'"

147.
Id. at 130 (Becker, C.J., dissenting); cf Christopher N. May, "What Do
We Do Now?": Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869, 870
(1995) (arguing that "the judge should either weave the evidence into the
instructions, or use the threat of doing so to induce counsel to link the evidence to
the law in their closing arguments"); William W. Schwarzer, Communicating
with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CaL L. Rev. 731, 744 (1981) ("By the time
the final instructions are given, the jury will have acquired a context from the
evidence. Instructions should therefore ... incorporat[e] that evidence."); compare
id. at 751 ("Particular inferences are a matter for argument that can and should
be left to counseL").
See, e.g., Edson Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13
148.
Mich. L. Rev. 302, 310 (1914) (advocating judicial comment).
149.
See Weinstein, supra note 111, at 169 ("Currently twenty states still
do not permit either summary or comment and seventeen more permit summary
only.").
150.
[d. at 166; see also Devitt, supra note 74, at 78 (arguing that the trial
judge should provide impartial summary and comment on the evidence).
Weinstein, supra note 111, at 173.
151.
152.
Id.
153.
See B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons» and "Speaking Rights":
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observed, a skilled argument by counsel might fill the void left by an
overly abstract jury charge. And a charge that ties the law to the
facts, pointing out key fact disputes and noting potential applications
of the law, might be inaccurate or might unduly sway the jury:54 But,
as the next section discusses, the trial inherently requires the judge
to make choices that will affect the way in which the jury frames the
questions in the case, and the way in which the jury perceives the
connections between the evidence and the relevant law. Recognizing
the effect of the trial process upon jury decision"making may not.1ead
us to a failsafe method for crafting optimal jury decision rules. But
such recognition can, at least, provide the means of choosing among
trial procedures with an eye to the effect on those decision rules.
IV. THE INTERACTION OF TRIAL PROCEDURES AND JURY DECISION
RULES

In recent decades, judges, legal scholars and social scientists
have responded to critiques of the jury system by proposing an
"active" model of jury decision-making. 155 Though this model may
have been designed largely to improve juries' ability to deal with
scientific and technical complexity (for example, in cases presenting
difficult questions of product safety and causation),156 the model can
also assist judges and juries in handling doctrinal complexities of the
sort discussed in Parts II and III.
Advocates of the "active learnivg" model contend that judges
should design the trial so as to facilitate the jury's learning
process. 157 Judges might "preinstruct" the jury-summarizing the
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 Ind. L.J. 1229, 1244 (1993)
(discussing "[t]he analogy between the courtroom and the classroom"); Schwarzer,
supra note 112, at 588 ("a trial is an exercise in education").
154.
On the other hand, even if the judge provides no comment on the
evidence she might nonetheless betray her views of the case. See Douglas G.
Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 541 (1997) ("Socia! science research
seems to support the conclusion that a judge's nonverbal behavior as well as his
verbal behavior may influence the jury's verdict.").
155.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The·' Historical and' Cbnstitutional
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 377, 382-83 (1996) (summarizing
proposals for "reforms that would result in a more active jury").
156.
See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et aI., Citizen Comprehension of Difficr,tlt Issues:
Les~ons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 727,756-60 (1991) (reviewing
data suggesting that "scientific and technical evidence" pose particular challenges
for juries).
157.
See, e.g., Brown, Plain Meaning, supra note 18, at 1233 (advocating
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relevant legal principles before the jury hears evidence-as well as
instructing the jury after the close of the evidence. They might
permit jurors to take notes and submit questions for witnesses, and
they might even (though this is particularly controversial) permit the
jurors to discuss the case before formal deliberations begin. They
might allow the lawyers to provide mini-arguments, at various points
during a long trial, to point out the significance of recent or upcoming
testimony. They could give the jurors written copies of the
instructions (as well as an oral rendition), and they could respond in
a substantive way to jurors' questions about the instructions.
Studies of these reforms have, naturally, focused on their
effects on the jury's decision-making process; and the evidence so far
supports the adoption of many of these innovations. In this section, I
will highlight some of the measures that are most likely to impact
jury decision rules.
A.

Structuring the presentation and application of decision
rules

Part III discussed the obvious point that a decision rule's
wording can be centrally important. But the effect of jury decision
rules depends as well upon the process by which those decision rules
are conveyed, and, indeed, upon a host of choices the judge and
lawyers make about the surrounding trial procedures. In the
interests of brevity, this section focuses on three of the most
important structural influences on jury decision rules: the timing and
format of the instructions and the trial judge's response to juror
questions about those instructions.
1.

......~
.

....
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Preliminary instructions

Though the applicable Civil Rule permits judges to "instruct
the jury at any time after trial begins and before the jury is

written copies, preinstruction, and simplification of instructions); Cronan, supra
note 117, at 1241-44, 1248-51 (advocating written copies, preinstruction, and
permission for juror note-taking); Smith, Historical and Constitutional Contexts,
supra note 155, at 457-58 (advocating simplification, less formality, judicial
comment, permitting juror questions for witnesses, early juror discussions, and
juror note-taking); Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing
Tools for Rational Jury Decisionmaking, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 221, 222-23 (1990)
(describing his "view of the role of a trial judge as the jurors' ally in their struggle
to resolve the difficult disputes submitted to them").
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discharged,"158 judges often wait until after the close of the evidence
to instruct the jury on the substantive law}S9 Defenders of the
standard practice point out that post hoc instructions can be more
readily tailored to the evidence actually presented at trial, and that
providing substantive instructions at the outset might tip the jury in
favor of the plaintiff by triggering a "confirmatory bias." Proponents
of preliminary substantive instructions counter that it makes little
sense to present evidence to the jury before the jury knows what the
plaintiff is required to prove, and that experimental. data ..indicate
that preinstruction can improve jury comprehension and application
of the instructions to the evidence. On balance, the evidence so far
indicates that preinstruction can be useful. 160 Beyond the benefits
ordinarily cited by proponents, preinstruction can playa particularly
useful role in addressing doctrinal complexity and in developing
appropriate decision rules for the jury.
Preliminary instructions on the relevant substantive law can
give the jury a framework for processing and recalling trial
testimony. Some experimental studies suggest that jurors who
receive preliminary instructions are better able to recall relevant
facts and more likely to apply relevant legal concepts properly. 161 A
158.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5l(b)(3).
159.
However, it is standard practice to give the jury some general
instructions about trial procedure at the outset of the trial. See Dann, supra note
153, at 1249 ("In most courtrooms, the pattern or scripted jury instructions given
at the outset of the case deal with very elementary legal principles of ge:o.eral
application and with various procedural or housekeeping matters. Rarely are
they tailored to the individual case."),
160.
I discuss the empirical evidence concerning preinstruction (and other
jury reforms) in greater detail in Expertise and the Legal Process, which will be
published as a chapter in a forthcoming book on medical malpractice reforms. See
Medical Malpractice and the U.S. Healthcare System: New Century, Different
Issues (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., Cambridge Univ. Press,
forthcoming May 2006).
161.
See Lynne ForsterLee et al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects
of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 78 J. Applied Psycho!. 14, 1&:--19"
(1993); Amiram Elwork et aI., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in
Light of It?, 1 L. & Hum. Behav. 163, 177 (1977); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of JudiciaF InstrTECtiarr
and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 1877, 1885 (1979)
(video simulation of a criminal trial; researchers found that "most preinstructed
subjects 'presumed innocent,' whereas the others 'presumed guilty"'). Another
experimental study of instruction timing found no significant effect on fact recall,
comprehension of abstract legal concepts, or preferences as to outcome, but did
find that providing substantive instructions "both before and after the evidence"
improved mock jurors' ability to apply the law to the facts of the case. Vicki L.
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field study of trials in Wisconsin state court found that judges in
trials where the jury had received preliminary instructions were
significantly "less surprised" by, and "more satisfied" wi,th. the
outcome chosen by the jury. 162
The benefits of preinstruction may. be particularly strong in
the sorts of civil rights trials discussed here. To the extent that- Bueh
trials confront the jury with complexity, the complexity will likely be
of the doctrinal sort discussed in Parts II and III rather than the
complexity that arises from difficult technical or scientific expert
testimony. An excessive force case, for example, will frequently
involve no particularly challenging scientific testimony, but may
require jurors to distinguish among multiple defendants to whom
differing theories of liability apply. 163 Some experimental data
indicate that preinstruction may help jurors to perceive distinctions
among multiple parties J64-which suggests that preinstruction may
Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors' Information Processing and
Decision Making, 76 J. Applied Psycho1. 220, 223-25 (l99l). In addition, mock
jurors "were significantly more likely to defer their verdict decisions" if they were
instructed on the law before they heard the evidence. Id. at 225.
162.
Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field
Experiment with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 L. & Hum. Behav. 409,
425-26 & tb1.l0 (1989). However, answers to multipl~hoice questions (about
the instructions) administered to jurors after the trial failed to show much, if any,
significant benefit from preinstruction. See id. at 424-25. Preliminary
instructions, when given, always included instructions on burden of proof but did
not always include instruction on the substantive law. See id. at 41&-18; thas;
the results of this study do not provide a clear measure of the effects of
substantive preinstructions.
163.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-59 (discussing supervisory,
bystander, and municipal liability). Some types of civil rights cases, particularly
in the employment discrimination context, may involve expert testimony
concerning statistical data. But many civil rights cases-such as those involving
claims of excessive force--will center upon less technical questions (e.g., Did the
officer use force? Was the force reasonable under the circumstances?). Even if
expert testimony is presented on such questions (for example, to establish the
trajectory of a bullet or the sequence of events during a shooting), such testimony
may be more comprehensible to jurors than the types of epidemiological evidence
that may be central in a products liability case.
164.
See ForsterLee et al., Juror Competence, supra note 161, at 17-18
(reporting that "(j]urors more clearly differentiated among the plaintiffs [as to
damages level] when preinstructed than when postinstructed"); Martin J.
Bourgeois et aI., Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of Preinstructian.. ar:uL
Deliberations on Decisions and Evidence Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. Applied
Psychol. 58, 60-64 (1995) (mock jurors who were told beforehand that they would
be asked to reach a verdict without deliberating with others were significantly
more likely to distinguish among plaintiffs with varying injury levels when
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help juries to sort through the issues in multi-defendant civil rights
trials.
At the same time, the conditions under which preinstruction
may produce a pro-plaintiff bias seem less likely to be present in
many civil rights cases. In particular, the results of one study
"suggest that preinstruction, when presented in a less complex... trial,
will generally aid systematic processing but when presented in the
context of more complex evidence will augment a proplaintiffbias."165
The study's authors based this conclusion on the facts that the
evidence in the mock trial favored the defense and that
"[p]reinstruction increased verdicts for the defendant when the
evidence was low in technicality, whereas it increased verdicts for the
plaintiff when the evidence was high in technicaIity"-technicality, in
this experiment, having to do with the abstruseness of the medical
jargon in the expert testimony.166 Even in trials that do involve
challenging medical or scientific issues, there are ways to render
those issues more accessible to the jury, as by encouraging expert
witnesses to use simpler tenns. In any event, civil rights caseS are
less likely than other types of cases (such as products liability or
medical malpractice cases) to involve medical, scientific or
probabilistic testimony; thus, the possible downside of preinstruction
seems less likely to manifest itself.
Preliminary instructions on the substantive law should not
be as detailed and comprehensive as the substantive instructions.
given after the close of the evidence. 167 Developments during the trial

preinstructed). In both of these experiments, other factors affected the impact of
preinstruction. ForsterLee et aI. varied the technical complexity of the evidence
in the mock trial, and found that the benefits of preinstruction appeared when
the complexity level of the evidence was "moderate" but not when it was "high."
ForsterLee et aI., Juror Competence, supra, at 17-18. Bourgeois et al. told some
mock jurors they would be deliberating and told others they would reach
decisions without discussing the case with others; jurors who knew they would be
deliberating did no better at distinguishing among plaintiffs when given
preinstructions.See Bourgeois et aI., supra, at 60-64.
165.
Bourgeois et aI., supra note 164, at 65.
166.
Id. (giving examples of the highly teclmical··versi(}n~"Adiagrrosis of
infiltrating ductal carcinoma was made on the basis of the results of an incisional
biopsy"-and its less technical counterpart-"Cancer of the breast was diagnosed
by surgically removing part of the lesion and analyzing it").
167.
When giving the preliminary instructions, the judge should emphasize
their provisional nature and should tell the jury that the instructions to be given
at the end of the trial will control (to the extent that they differ from those given
at the outset). See Dann, supra note 153, at 1250.
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may alter the landscape, perhaps rendering some elements
undisputed or disclosing new ways in which the law might apply to
the evidence. But certain basic decisions can and should be made at a
preliminary charging conference before the trial begins. 168 The trial
judge should establish the elements of the claim, and should
ascertain whether some of those elements are undisputed. 169 In.
particular, the court should decide on the basic decision rules
applicable to the relevant constitutional violation. (For example, in
the Giron litigation, it should have been established prior to the start
of trial that an inmate who proves a rape by a prison guard need not
also separately prove "malice" in order to show an Eighth
Amendment violation. 170) And the judge should distinguish among
multiple defendants, noting any differences among the theories of
liability pertaining to each.
The preliminary instructions, then, can state the decision
rule at a relatively high level of generality. A totality-of-thecircumstances decision rule can be stated in its abstract form (e.g.,
"the amount of force, if any, which a reasonable officer would have
used under similar circumstances"), without providing an illustrative
list of potentially relevant circumstances. And a relatively novel way
of applying the relevant decision rule need not be flagged in the
preliminary instructions. So, for example, the trial judge in Grazier
could have given a preliminary instruction setting forth the basic
decision rule for deadly force cases, without commenting on the
potential relevance of conduct by the officers that led up to the use of
deadly force. 171 This approach would give the trial judge somewhat
more time to consider what might be a novel legal question,172 and
would allow the judge to avoid the issue in the event that evidence
presented during trial did not make the issue relevant.
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Concededly, providing preliminary instructions will frontload
the work that the judge (and counsel) must perform concerning the

168.
The court may set a deadline for the submission of proposed
instructions that is prior to the close of the evidence, so long as that deadline is
set at a "reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 5l(a)(n
169.
The requirement of action under color of state law, for example, often
will be undisputed.
170.
See supra text accompanying notes 127-135.
171.
See supra text accompanying notes 136- 145.
Cf Grazier v. City of Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
172.
that the Third Circuit had not yet decided whether to adopt the doctrine "that an
officer acts unreasonably if his improper conduct creates the situation making
necessary the use of deadly force").
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instructions. But much of the basic legal work must be done in any
event, in order to resolve other questions during trial (for example,
concerning evidentiary matters). Drafting preliminary instructions
provides an occasion for the court, and counsel, to establish the basic
decision rules under which the trial will proceed;173 and this, in turn,
can help the judge to approach with greater analytical clarity the
later task of tailoring those decision rules to the evidence actually
presented. In the meantime, the preliminary instructions can assist
jurors by providing a frame into which to fit the evidence they-hear.
2.

Spoken and written instructions

Judges always deliver their instructions through the spoken
word. This is as it should be. Indeed, if one had to choose one
medium-spoken or written-for the delivery of instructions, the
choice would be obvious. If a decision rule is so full ofjargon that one
- cannot speak it with a straight face, there is something wrong with
the decision rule. 174 But one does not have to choose. Spoken
instructions can be accompanied by written copies. A jury might be
able to hear a simple decision rule and retain the gist; but one of any
complexity should be provided in writing-as well.
Although three field studies have attempted to measure the
effects of written instructions on jury performance,175 none of those
studies would necessarily have detected such effects. Only one of the
three studies found significantly better performance by jurors whohad been given written copies of the instructions. 176 But it appears
that each of the studies employed questionnaires that the jurors
filled out after completing their service, at a time when they may
well not have had access to a copy of the instructions. 177

173.
Cf. Schwarzer, supra note 112, at 578 ("One way judges can promote
issue identification and narrowing is by requiring lawyers to submit proposed
substantive jury instruction before the pretrial conference.").
In an interesting parallel, Joseph Goldstein has observed that the oral
174.
statements that Supreme Court Justices deliver from the bench-when
announcing decisions-are sometimes much more intelligible than the written
opinions that follow. See Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible-Constitution (l~;
175.
See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 162; Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors'
Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 L. & Hum. Behav. 539 (1992);
Gel;Jffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury
Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Mwhigan Juror Comprehension Project,
23 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 401 (1990).
176.
See Kramer & Koenig, supra note 175, at 428.
177.
See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 162, at 417, 420; Reifman et al.,
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The Wisconsin state court field study, though it did not detect
clear signs that written instructions result in better jury
performance,l78 did demonstrate that judges and lawyers found no
downsides to the practice. 179 To the contrary, while judges "d[id] not
expect written instructions to make the trial more fair," judges who
conducted trials in which written instructions were provided. to the
jury reported "that the written copy definitely did make the trial
more fair. "180
When a decision rule is laid out in print, various visual
techniques can help to delineate relevant concepts. For example,
numbered elements can be indented and set off with bullet points;
bullet points can also draw attention to the factors in a multi-factor
test. Thus, written copies can help convey the concepts in a complex
decision rule, and can also serve as a reminder to which jurors can
refer during trial and deliberations.
3.

Questions about the instructions

Consistent with the model of courtroom as classroom,181
Judge Weinstein suggests that the judge, when reading the charge to
the jury, should pause periodically and ask the jurors if they
understand the instructions. J 82 Many judges may be unwilling to go
that far; they may believe that soliciting juror questions is asking for
trouble, and that many such questions might be resolved by the jury
during deliberations, without interference from the judge. Either
way, it is at any rate essential for the judge to respond in a
meaningful fashion if the jury does ask questions. 183

supra note 175, at 545, 551; Kramer & Koenig, supra note 175, at 406, 409.
178.
See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 162, at 420-21 (reporting results of
tests and questionnaires administered to jurors).
179.
See id. at 423.
180.
[d. at 423-24 & tb1.8.
181.
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence,
Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1971
(1997).
182.
See Weinstein, supra note Ill, at 184; cf. Cronan, supra note 117, at
1232-33 (proposing a criminal rule of procedure that would require judges to hold
a pre-deliberation colloquy with jurors to ensure that they understand key
concepts).
183.
See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury
Instructions, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 37, 40 (1993) (stressing "the need to inform jurors
of their right to ask questions about instructions that they do not understand,
and to receive an adequate response").
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An adequate response may well require more than simply
directing the jury's attention to the relevant portion of the
instructions. It is true that, if the instructions as drafted meet the
standard for legal correctness, the trial judge will not likely be
reversed for following this course of action. 184 Indeed, some appellate
courts have even gone so far as to warn that trial judges should be
wary of straying from the original instructions. 18S
For example, in Humphrey v. Staszak, a jury deliberating
over a false arrest claim asked the judge "whether it was 'appropriate
to find for the Plaintiff if we believe a defendant was responsible for
escalating or provoking the situation?'"186 The trial judge responded
by giving the jury an instruction on the state-law defense of
entrapment. 187 Unfortunately, such an instruction was inapposite,
both because there was no evidence to support the elements of an
entrapment defense, and because even if the plaintiff could prove
entrapment that would not necessarily establish a lack of probable
cause to arrest!88 Holding that the instruction was prejudicial, the
Court of Appeals opined:
All trial judges are aware of the difficulty questions from a
jury can cause after the jury has begun its deliberations. It
is often a delicate situation for a trial judge who wishes in
good faith, as in this case, to be helpful in answering a
jury's question without unfairly affecting the verdict. At
times it is better to answer the jury's question simply by
telling the jury that the instructions already given are
adequate to decide the case. 189

Although it is apparent that the response given by the trial
judge in Humphrey was ill-advised, so was the response by the Court
of Appeals. The problem with the trial judge's approach was not that

184.
Cf. Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 701, 704 (2000)
(discussing the Supreme Court's holding "in Weeks u. Angelone[, 528 U.S. 225
(2000),] ... that a trial judge who presides over a death penalty case is not
obliged to clear up the jury's confusion over a crucial sentencing instruction by
doing anything more than pointing to the controlling language of the
instructions").
185.
See Brown, Decision Effects, supra note 111, at 1109 n.18 (noting that
"[slome appellate courts affirmatively discourage trial courts from attempting to
exp,lain or clarify instructions").
186.
148 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1998).
187.
See id. at 723.
188.
See id. at 723-24.
189.
Id. at 724-25.
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he departed from the previous instructions. Rather, the difficulty was
that he did so by providing an additional instruction that was a poor
conceptual fit with the case and that was not warranted by the
evidence. It would have been more helpful had the Court of Appeals
attempted to provide some guidance on the considerations that
should inform a judge's response to juror questions, rather than
trying to deter meaningful responses altogether.
Concededly, the Court of Appeals would have had to exercise
some creativity in shaping such guidance, because the Civil Rulespossibly reflecting a vision of a passive rather than active jury-do
not address the trial court's duties in responding to questions from
jurors. Useful analogies are available, however. For example, in
Douglas v. Owens, the jury-while deliberating over the plaintiff's
excessive force claims against four prison guards-"sent a note to the
judge asking if they could move Griffith [one of the guards] from
question one to question two" on the special verdict form-i.e., "the
jurors wished to consider whether Griffith had 'approved the use of
force' rather than consider if Griffith had actually himself 'used
force.,"19o
To the Court of Appeals in Douglas, the trial court's grant of
this request raised a "fundamental concern": that "Griffith was never
on notice of any claim that he failed to intervene while others
improperly used force" against the plaintiff. 191 In assessing the risk of
prejudice to Griffith from this shift in the liability theory, the Court
of Appeals chose to view the issue through the lens of Civil Rule
15(b), which governs amendment of the pleadings to conform to the
evidence at trial. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, Rule 15(b) is
designed for situations in which a party, rather than the jury, seeks
to change the theory of the case. 192 But the general framework set by
Rule 15(b) seems appropriate when the change is initiated by the
jury, as well. The Rule sets a presumption in favor of changes that
will serve "the presentation of the merits," unless "the objecting party
... satisflies] the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense."'93
190.
50 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (3d Cir. 1995).
191.
Id. at 1234.
192.
Id. at 1235.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). When a party seeks to alter a matter provided
193.
for in the final pretrial order, courts sometimes apply the more stringent
standard set by Rule 16, which requires the party seeking the change to show
that it is necessary "to prevent manifest injustice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). As
between the two paradigms, Rule 15(b) seems more appropriate for use when the
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The Rule also permits the court to "grant a continuance to enable the
objecting party to meet" the evidence that comes in under the
amended pleading;'94 an analogous strategy will not be as easy to
implement when the evidence has closed and the jury has begun
deliberations, but if the court accedes to the jury's request the court
certainly should provide an opportunity for further argument by
counsel, if not for the submission of additional evidence.
The Douglas court's suggestion addresses the possibility that
a jury's question might prompt a change in the liability theory
conveyed by the instructions. More commonly, a jury might simply
seek clarification of the existing instructions. In that event, the judge,
should respond to the substance of the question, and should seek to
ensure that the jurors have understood the response. In either type
of case, before responding to any questions concerning the
instructions, the judge should consult with counsel and should
apprise counsel of the response that the judge intends to make.
B.

Allocating decisions between judge and jury

Numerous procedural choices can influence the ways in
which jurors receive and apply a decision rule. Among those choices,
the type of verdict form is so significant that it merits consideration
in a separate section. The trial judge's selection of the form of the
verdict-general (with or without interrogatories), or specialdivides decision-making authority between jury and judge, and also
structures the jury's decision-making process. I argue, in Part
IV.B.!., that the best option, at least in complex cases, is a general
v.erdict accompanied by interrogatories; such a verdict form can guide
the jury's decision-making and provide .insight into its reasoning,
without stripping the jury of its normative role in applying the
Constitution. In Part IV.B.2., I examine an exception to this
principle: where a question of qualified immunity presents an issue
of historical fact, the court should pose interrogatories to the jury on
the questions of fact but should not put the issue of immunity to the
Jury.

jury requests a change; the fact that the jury takes the initiative to seek the
chapge suggests that it may be likely that the merits would be served by the
change, and the fact that the jury, not the party, is the one seeking the change
indicates that the interest in strictly enforcing the terms of the pretrial order may
be somewhat less strong.
194.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
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A presumption in favor of a general verdict (with
interrogatories)

The conceptual distinction among the types of verdict forms
is relatively straightforward. "If the jury announces only its ultimate
conclusions, it returns an ordinary general verdict; if it makes factual
findings in addition to the ultimate legal conclusions, it returns a
general verdict with interrogatories."195 By contrast, "[i]f it returns
only factual findings, leaving the court to determine the ultimate
legal result, it returns a special verdict."'96
In federal courts, the trial judge possesses broad discretion to
choose among these verdict forms. 197 This discretion is all the more
striking because the choice determines whether the jury plays any
role in applying the law, or whether its only function is to find the
historical facts. Proponents of the special verdict argue that it plays
to the jury's strengths while minimizing the impact of its
weaknesses:
The litigation is packaged for the lay jurors into those
components they are most familiar and comfortable with:
actual facts. The necessity for instructions on legal
constructs is completely avoided, thus streamlining the
trial and appellate stages and obviating the problems of
jury comprehension. Since the jurors must go on record
with their fact findings, and the judge for her application of
legal principles, accountability of the actors in the litigation
process is increased while reviewability of their work is
enhanced. 198

.

,.
.,'

As this article seeks to show, problems of comprehension
certainly do arise when juries are asked to apply constitutional
decision rules. But, as this article also seeks to suggest, strategies
exist to address those problems without removing the constitutional
issue from the jury. It would be particularly ironic for a judge to
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195.
Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir.
2003).
196.
Id.
197.
See, e.g., Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596,605 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Whether a
court uses a special or general verdict rests in its discretion, as does the content
and form of any interrogatories it chooses to submit."); Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d
1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) ("As a general rule, the court has complete discretion
over whether to have the jury return a sp~cial verdict or a general verdict.").
198.
Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the
Litigation Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 15, 90-91
(1990).
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remove from the jury the application of provisions in the Bill of
Rights-a basic set of protections that exist to delineate the
individual's relation to the government.
Of course, the very importance of those protections might
provide a reason to relegate their application to a judge rather than a
jury,199 and the Court has done so in the context.of the exclusionary
rules concerning evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments. 200 But the Court removed the exclusionary-rule
question from the jury because it doubted the jury's ability' to
disregard excluded evidence when determining guilt-not necessarily
because it doubted the jury's ability to determine the constitutional
question itself. 201
Admittedly, some courts take the view that certain
constitutional reasonableness tests-such as the Fourth Amendment
test for excessive force-should be determined by the judge when
there are no material disputes of historical fact. Such a view, of
course, would depart from the treatment of reasonableness in tort
law, where many cases go to the jury even in the absence of a dispute
of historical fact. 202 A primary rationale for sending such cases to the
199.
Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1175, 1182 (1989) ("I frankly do not know why we treat some of these
questions as matters of fact and others as matters of law-though I imagine that
their relative importance to our liberties has much to do with it.").
200.
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1964) (stating that a judge
must rule on the voluntariness of a confession before evidence of that confession
is provided to a jury that will determine question of guilt or innocence).
201.
See id. at 388 ("Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other
evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal
when the jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?"). Indeed, the
Court noted that "{w]hether the trial judge, another judge, or another jury, but
not the convicting jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is not a matter of
concern here. To this extent ... the States are free to allocate functions between
judge and jury as they see fit." ld. at 391 n.19. An additional argument could be
made that juries may be harsher than judges in their judgments of guilty
defendants, and that this may make juries less willing to provide an exclusionary
remedy, see, e.g., Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 820, 844 (1994) (noting that such defendants are "unlikely to win a
jury's sympathy"); in this view, it is appropriate to entrust the exclusionary
decision to the judge rather than to a jury (even if the jury is a different one from
the one that will determine guilt).
As Justice Hunt famously explained:
202.
In some cases . . . the necessary inference from the proof is so
certain that it may be ruled as a question of law . . . . So if a
coachdriver intentionally drives within a few inches of a
precipice, and an accident happens, negligence may be ruled as
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jury is that reasonableness is a judgment call-and one that juries
are particularly well qualified to make, because of the range ofjurors'
life experiences. 203
Judge Easterbrook recently asserted that such a rationale is
misplaced in the Fourth Amendment context. Drawing on the
Supreme Court's holdings that a trial judge's suppression rulings tm
reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo
on appea1 204 and that the Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis
proceeds from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer under the
circumstances/os he argued that in such excessive force cases
the right question is how things appeared to objectively
reasonable officers at the time of the events, not how they
appear in the courtroom to a cross-section of the civilian
community .... [W]hen material facts (or enough of them
to justify the conduct objectively) are undisputed, then
there would be nothing for a jury to do except second-guess
the officers. _ .. Judges rather than juries determine what
limits the Constitution places on official conduct. 206

One might well question Judge Easterbrook's contention that
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a question of law. On the other hand, if he had placed a
suitable distance between his coach and the precipice, but by
the breaking of a rein or an axle, which could not have been
anticipated, an injury occurred, it might be ruled as a question
of law that there was no negligence and no liability. But these
are extreme cases. The range between them is almost infinite
in variety and extent. It is in relation to these intermediate
cases that the opposite rule prevails.
Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663 (1873).
203.
Justice Hunt, for example, asserted:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men
of education and men of little education, men of learning and
men whose learning consists only in what they have
themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and
draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus
given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than
does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.
Id. at 664.
204.
See Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996).
205.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Acosta v.
206.
Ames Department Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 8-9 (lst Cir. 2004) (following Bell with
respect to probable cause issue in false arrest case).
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the Fourth Amendment "creates legal rules" and for that reason "is
not a form of tort law.,,207 A totality-of-the-circumstances test-such
as the Fourth Amendment excessive force test-is a standard rather
than a rule; and as Justice Scalia has pointed out, judges applying
such a standard are engaged in a task similar to that traditionally
given to the jury.20S And one might doubt Judge Easterbrook's view
that the objective nature of that excessive force test renders it
unsuitable for the jury; after all, the tort standard of due care is also
an objective one. In some places at some points in time, juries might
well be inferior to judges in their determination of civil rights claims.
But in other places and times, juries might be better suited to the
task, especially since the jurors' collective experience will almost
certainly be broader than that of the judge.
To resolve the question raised by Judge Easterbrook would
take us beyond the scope of this Article. It is, in any event,
uncontroversial that if there are material disputes of historical fact, a
constitutional tort case must go to the jury, and that when it does,
the jury can be asked to render a general verdict. Absent empirical
data supporting the conclusion that juries are unsuited to the task,
other values support the notion that juries should be involved in
applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights in civil suits.
As many have noted, jury service educates jurors about the,
legal process and about the law,209 and involves them in selfgovemment. 2lO Such educative and self·government functions are"
particularly desirable in the context of basic civil rights norms. 211 It
also can be argued that a jury finding of liability in a civil rights case

207.
Bell, 321 F.3d at 640.
208.
See Scalia, supra note 199, at 1187 ("[A]ppellate judges [should] bear
in mind that when we have finally reached the point where we can do no more
than consult the totality of the circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders
than as expositors of the law.").
209.
See, e.g., Hayden J. Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors
Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror
Disagreement on Issues, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1983) (noting that "the
American jury system serves an educative function").
210.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Tim Suggested Reforms, 28
D.C. Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1174 (1995) ("The deepest constitutional function ofthe
jury is to serve the people, not the parties-to serve them by involving them in
the', administration of justice and the grand . project of democratic selfgovernment.").
211.
Cf. Amar, Reinventing Juries, supra note 210, at 1192 ("The
Constitution comes from the people, and the people should have some role in
administering it and saying what it means.").
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serves as a more effective pronouncement than a judge's disposition
would, because it can be seen as embodying the judgment of
representatives of the community.212 The latter function would be
diluted if the judgment of liability were pronounced by the court
upon the jury's findings of fact in a special verdict; though the jury
would have been involved in the process, it would not have made the
ultimate normative judgment that the defendant should be held
liable. And the former functions would be eliminated by the use of a
special verdict: as its proponents point out, one of the very rationales
for the special verdict is that it removes the need for the judge to
spend time and effort explaining the law to the jury.213 This
argument might carry weight in the case of, for example, an antitrust
claim; most individuals will not feel the weight of the antitrust laws,
in any direct way, in their personal lives. But the point is much less
persuasive when it comes to civil rights, for these are rights that
define each individual's relation to the state and state officials.
Using a general verdict in a civil rights case, then, empowers
the jury as a constitutional decision-maker. In a simple case
involving only a single defendant and one theory of liability, a
general verdict may be all that is needed. But in more complex
cases-involving multiple defendants with different liability
standards, for example--the Delphic nature of a general verdict may
leave doubt as to the reasoning behind the jury's choices. 214 In such
cases the addition of special interrogatories can help to ensure that
the jury considers carefully the varying issues that pertain to each
defendant and claim,215 and can provide greater insight into the
jury's reasoning.
212.
See, e.g., Brown, Plain Meaning, supra note 18, at 1215 (noting that
"juries are groups designed to represent local communities and to bring local
norms and 'common sense' to bear on legal judgments").
213.
See Brodin, supra note 198, at 90-91; see also Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d
1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the use of special verdicts "permits the
judge to give a minimum of legal instruction to the jurors"), It is not self-evident
that the use of special verdicts will always eliminate the need for instruction on
the substantive law. Civil Rule 49 requires the judge to "give to the jury such
explanation and instruction ... as may be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
In multi-defendant cases, even a general verdict form will not be
214.
particularly short. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 12.451, at 160
(2004) ("A general verdict form should at least require separate verdicts on each
claim and on damages, but be drafted so as to prevent duplicate damage
awards.").
ld. at § 11.633, at 123 ("Special verdict forms or interrogatories , , .
215.
may help the jury focus on the issues ...."),
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The relative transparency that special interrogatories provide
is not without its downsides. Compared with a general verdict,
"interrogatories increase the length and complexity of deliberations
and are more likely to produce inconsistencies"216--or , at least, more
likely to reveal them. Jurors who could reach agreement as to the
result, but not as to the details of the narrative underlyj.ng the
result/ 17 may find it more difficult to reach a verdict if they are
required to answer special interrogatories. A defendant is entitled to
avoid liability unless the jury unanimously finds th·at·the elements·o-f
the claim are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.2 18 But it is
much less clear that the defendant is entitled to jury unanimity on
the details of the narrative underpinning that fmding. 219 If two
possible narratives each could, if true, establish the elements of the
claim, and if each of the jurors believes that one of those narratives is
more likely true than not true, then it seems reasonable to conclude
that the plaintiff has proven his claim and should recover. 220 But if
216.
Id. at § 12.451, at 161.
217.
For a discussion of the "story model" of juror decision-making, see, e.g.,
Brown, Plain Meaning, supra note 18, at 1216-17.
218.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48 ("Unless the parties otherwise stipulate, the
verdict shall be unanimous"). I drafted the statement in the text carefully, to
preserve an ambiguity that is frequently present in jury instructions: Does the
plaintiff have to prove that each element is more likely true than not true, or
rather that it is more likely than not that the elements all are true? Pointing out
that the probability of the conjunction of multiple elements will often be smaller
than each of those elements' probabilities taken separately, commentators. have.
labeled this issue the "conjunction problem." Saul Levmore, Conjunction and
Aggregation, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 723, 724 (2001). Scholars have suggested a number
of responses to this problem. See, e.g., id. at 726 (noting the argument "that
issues like negligence and causation are not likely to be perfectly independent of
one another"); id. at 732 (describing the "story model" of juror decision-making
and noting that "the more we imagine the factfinder to be comparing two stories,
the less it matters whether the factfinder multiplies probabilities"); id. at 756
(arguing that the effects of the jury unanimity requirement may offset the effects
of a failure to require the jury to multiply the probabilities of each element).
219.
Cf. Darryl K Brown, Judicial Instructions, Defendant Culpability,
and Jury Interpretation of Law, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 25, 30 (2002) (noting
with respect to criminal prosecutions that the "Supreme Court has left wide
leeway, as a matter of constitutional law, for juror disagreement on the particular
facts or theories underlying a charge").
220.
Hayden Trubitt has termed such verdicts "patchwork verdicts." See
T,rubitt, supra note 209, at 511 (arguing. that "[p.latch.work. verdicts are... in
general, valid and proper," but not "where the 'patched' grounds are not part of a
sole transaction, do not have a common focus of injury, or do not call for exactly
the same remedy"). One commentator advocates requiring juror agreement on the
facts underlying civil jury verdicts, on the grounds that such a requirement will
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the interrogatories on the verdict form pose detailed inquiries about
the underlying facts, those jurors might not be able to reach
consensus on the answers.
If the jury deadlocks in such a case, the judge could ask the
jurors the basis for their disagreement. If it becomes clear that the
disagreement concerns the factual details, but that each juror
subscribes to a version of those facts that would support a plaintiff
verdict, then perhaps the court (in consultation with counsel) could
redraft the interrogatories to provide alternative options for
answering the factual questions. 221 The court should then provide any
additional instruction necessary to enable the jury to respond to the
revised interrogatories.
More generally, the judge should regard the responses to the
interrogatories as a continuation of the dialogue between judge and
jury. Obviously, if the jury's general verdict and interrogatory
responses are consistent, then that dialogue has come to a successful
close and the court should enter judgment upon the verdict.222 If the
interrogatory responses are internally consistent but they do not
support the general verdict, the court has the authority to enter
judgment "in accordance with the answers," or to send the case back
to the jury, or to order a new tria1. 223 If the interrogatory answers are

promote careful juror deliberations. See Elizabeth A. Larsen, Specificity and
Juror Agreement in Civil Cases, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 379, 396 (2002) ("If specificity
is not required, jurors can render verdicts without fully fleshing- out the
differences among them."). Such a concern might weigh against pointing out to
the jury, ex ante, that jurors can disagree on the facts and still return a verdict.
But if jurors are not told of such a rule, they are unlikely to guess it; and thus a
judge's willingness to permit a jury to return a verdict even though jurors are
split between two different views of the facts supporting that verdict should not
decrease the care with which the jury approaches its task. Moreover, even if
jurors are aware of the possibility that they could return a verdict despite such
disagreement, the use of special interrogatories concerning the underlying facts
should help to promote thorough discussion during the deliberations.
221.
Cf Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2512 ("The court presumably has the power to clarify the text of the
interrogatory if it is confident that the result would have a positive effect ....").
If the judge chooses this course, she should take care to indicate clearly that the
two possible sets of responses are not to be mixed and matched: each juror should
choose one or the other, or neither.
222.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b) ("When the general verdict and.the.answerS-.
are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be
entered ...."). Unless, of course, the verdict loser makes a post-verdict motion for
judgment as a matter oflaw or a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
223.
Fed. R. eiv. P. 49(b).
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internally inconsistent (as well as inconsistent with the general
verdict), then the court must either return the case to the jury or
order a new trial. 224
Though a full discussion of the considerations implicated by
these choices is beyond the scope of this article, the court's response
to inconsistency in the jury's answers should take aecount··of thenormative arguments in favor of retaining constitutional decisionmaking authority in the jury. For example, those arguments weigh
against the entry of judgment on consistent interrogatory answers
notwithstanding a contrary general verdict. Such an inconsistency
suggests juror confusion, which in turn indicates a need for the trial
judge to engage in a colloquy with the jurors in order to discern the
source of that confusion. After that colloquy, the judge could consult
with counsel and design further instructions to clarify the jury's task.
The court could follow a similar procedure in cases where the
interrogatory answers are internally inconsistent. In other words,
unless special considerations indicate the need for a new trial the
trial judge should see inconsistency in the jury's answers as an
opportunity to identify and address juror confusion through colloquy
and additional instructions.
2.

An exception for qualified immunity

The use of interrogatories can guide jurors' analysis in
complex cases and can assist the court in identifying and addressing
juror confusion. It is to be hoped that, in many instances, the careful
crafting of jury decision rules will prevent such confusion from
arising. Some tasks, however, are so unlikely to be tractable for a
jury that they simply should not be presented for consideration. In
particular, qualified immunity issues should not go to the jury; those
issues present an exceptional instance in which the use of a special
verdict is preferable. 225
Qualified immunity doctrine was not designed with juries in
mind; to the contrary, it was designed specifically to promote the
224.
See id.
225.
For a discussion of the general issue of jury determinations in cases
involving historical fact disputes material to qualified immunity, see Henk J.
Brands,. Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of De.cisiD.a:. Making:.
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1065 (1990) ("[T]he
judge must identify the content of 'clearly established law' as he would on a
motion for summary judgment and instruct the jury accordingly. In his
discretion, he may request either a general or a special verdict.").
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resolution of cases by summary judgment prior to tria1. 226 As I
discussed in Part n,227 the qualified immunity decision rule asks
whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer under the
circumstances that the conduct in question violated the Constitution.
Part II noted that this decision rule applies even when the
underlying constitutional principle itself includes a reasonableness
test. Thus, for example, to determine whether a police officer used
excessive force in making an arrest, the jury must ask whether the
officer used more force than would a reasonable officer under the
circumstances. But under the Supreme Court's teaching, even if this
test is met, the defendant can obtain qualified immunity by showing
that the violation would not have been clear to a reasonable officer
under the circumstances. 228
A jury asked to decide the qualified immunity question in
such a case would be asked, in effect,229 to decide the following two
questions: "First, did the defendant use more force against the
plaintiff than a reasonable officer would have used under the same
circumstances? Second, if so, then would it have been clear to a
reasonable officer under the circumstances that the force defendant
used was more than a reasonable officer would have used under the
circumstances ?"230

....'

The Supreme Court has surmounted this conceptual
challenge. The difficulty, explains the Court, arises merely from the
fortuity that the Fourth Amendment standard has been cast in terms
of "reasonableness"; "[h]ad an equally serviceable term, such as
226.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that the
Court's objective standard for qualified immunity "should . . . permit the
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment").
227.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
228.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,641 (1987); Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194,201 (2001).
229.
I do not suggest that the language quoted in the text would be the
best attempt at a jury decision rule on qualified immllllity; rather, I use that
language to highlight the peculiar nature of the analysis that qualified immunity
requires.
230.
See Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 80 n.15 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Qualified
imnnmity . . . looks to the reasonableness of an officer's belief that he acted
lawfully after the officer is found to have been unreasonable in his conduct. This
inherently makes for confusion."); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th
Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("To ... instruct the jury further that even if the police acted
without probable cause they should be exonerated if they reasonably (though
erroneously) believed that they were acting reasonably is to confuse the jury and
give the defendants two bites at the apple."), overruled on other grounds by
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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'undue' . . . been employed," the qualified immunity analysis would
not seem so confusing. 231 Or at least, it would be no more confusing in
the Fourth Amendment context than it is anywhere - else:
"[RJegardless of the terminology used, the precise content of most of
the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment
of what accommodation between governmental need and individual
freedom is reasonable"-which means that the "reasonably
unreasonable" objection, "if it has any substance, applies to the
application of [qualified immunity) generally.,,232
Whether or not this defense of qualified immunity doctrine
persuades jurisprudes, it does provide further support for the viewthat this is not the sort of analysis in which one should ask the jury
to engage?33 Indeed, though at least two circuits have stated to the
contrary,234 and though some model jury instructions include

231.
ld. at 643.
232.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643-44.
233.
Nor would the qualified immunity analysis be more tractable in cases
where the constitutional claim requires a showing of subjective bad intent. It
seems incongruous to suggest that a defendant could ever obtain qualified
immunity if the plaintiff proves a claim that includes an element such as malice
and sadism or subjective deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Johnson v. Breeden,
280 F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2002) (where plaintiff proves Eighth
Amendment excessive force violation, "the subjective element required to
establish it is so extreme that every conceivable set of circumstances in which.
this constitutional violation occurs is clearly established to be a violation of the
Constitution"); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 143 n.15 (3d Cir. 20UU
("Because deliberate indifference under Farmer requires actual knowledge or
awareness on the part of the defendant, a defendant cannot have qualified
immunity if she was deliberately indifferent."). On the other hand, the Court's
reasoning in Hope u. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), might provide some ground to
argue the contrary. In Hope, the Court assumed that the plaintiffs allegations
met the Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indifference standard for
conditions-of-confinement claims, see id. at 737, and then proceeded to consider
whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 739.
Though the Court ultimately held that they were not, it did so on the ground that
caselaw, a state regulation and a DOJ report should have made the
constitutionality of the conduct unclear, see id. at 741-42, not on the ground that
qualified immunity is simply incompatible with a finding of subjective deliberate
indifference.
If the Court were to hold that qualified immunity could coexist with a finding
of subjective bad intent, and if the qualified immunity issue were submitted to
the j~, the inherent incongruity of the analysis \Yould be likely to produce Wry,
confusion.
234.
See McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
argument that trial judge erred in submitting qualified immunity issue to jury,
and explaining that, "while qualified immunity ordinarily should be decided by
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instructions on the subject,235 a number of circuits have concluded
that issues of qualified immunity should not be submitted to the
jury.236 Rather, if the resolution of the qualified immunity defense
turns on questions of historical fact, special interrogatories can be
put to the jury on those fact issues, and the judge can use the
answers to determine the question ofimmunity.237

V. CONCLUSION
In my effort to sketch an approach to the creation of
constitutional decision rules for juries, I have drawn upon two widely
disparate sets of scholarship. This Article shares with Professor
Berman's work on constitutional decision rules a focus on the
relation between those rules and the characteristics of the
institutions that apply them. But instead of focusing on the
differences between courts and other decision-makers, I have focused
on distinctions, within courts, between judge and jury. Likewise, this

; ..

the court long before trial, if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to
the jury"); Ortega v. O'Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
"the defendants were entitled to an instruction" on qualified immunity).
235.
See Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 10.1; O'Malley et
aI., supra note 83, § 165.23; Leonard Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury
Instructions-Civil § 87-86 (2001); Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 83, § 17.02.1; but
see Schwartz & Pratt, supra note 83, § 17.02.1 note ("This instruction is
appropriate only in those circuits that permit submission of the qualified
immunity defense to the jury.").
236.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002)
("[T]he jury does not apply the law relating to qualified immunity to those
historical facts it finds; that is the court's duty"); Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d
553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that "the district court should submit factual
questions to the jury and reserve for itself the legal question of whether the
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the facts found by the jury").
237.
See, e.g., Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11th Cir. 1992) ("11
there are disputed issues of fact concerning qualified immunity that must be
resolved by a full trial and which the district court determines that the jUlJi
should resolve, special interrogatories would be appropriate."); Stephenson v.
Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that on remand trial court should
submit special interrogatories to jury concerning factual disputes underlyin~
issue of qualified immunity); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1202'n.15 (7t1:
Cir. 1988) ("In the unusual circumstance where an immunity inquiry remaim
unresolved at the time the case goes to the jury, the district court may consideJ
the use of special interrogatories to allow the jury to resolve disputed facts ....")
overruled on other grounds by Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941-42 (7th Cir
2004); see also Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 563 (1st Cir. 2003
("[T]he judge is certainly not obliged to submit the ultimate issue [of qualifie<
immunity] to the jury.").
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Article shares with the literature on jury reforms a concern with the
impact of trial procedures on jury functioning, and a focus on the
need for careful drafting of instructions. But instead of focusing on
those questions as they may arise in a variety of types of cases, I
have examined the ways in which trial process and instruction
crafting influence juries' application of the Bill of Rights.
I have not, in this article, attempted to establish in detail
who should take up each of the tasks I have suggested. But clearly
there is room for work by many actors. The Supreme Court, and the
Courts of Appeals, should be more conscious of the fact that many of
the decision rules they adopt for the implementation of the BiB of·
Rights will be applied by juries as well as judges. The authors of
opinions from which those decision rules will be derived could
indicate more clearly which part of the opinion is intended as a
decision rule (rather than, say, a justification for the decision rule or
a description of its effects). And opinion authors should try, where
possible, to avoid using terms that are likely to confuse a jury. Such
efforts would bring benefits outside as well as within the trial
context: When constitutional decision rules are crafted with an eye
toward their application by juries, the content of those rules should
become more accessible to those by whose putative consent the
government exists. 238
This article also has implications for the approach taken by
committees or task forces that draft model instructions. The··
foundational works on drafting jury instructions emphasize the
importance of testing instructions on jury-eligible populations for
comprehensibility and accuracy. This, indeed, is an idea1 approach,
though it also can be prohibitively expensive, especially when the
instructions to be tested are lengthy and multifarious. Short of a
huge empirical research project involving teams of linguists and
social scientists, is there any role for more modest efforts by
committees composed oflawyers and judges?
This article suggests that there is. As I have argued, some of
the greatest challenges in formulating constitutional decision rules
arise because of the area's doctrinal complexity. To that extent,
efforts by law-trained drafting committees can -advance the- baH
2~8.
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 174, at 19 (''That the Constitution he.
intelligible and accessible to We the People of the United States is requisite to a
government by consent
"); Smith, supra note 154, at 489 ("The fact that
jurors are not legal experts
puts pressure on the legal system to simplify legal
principles ....").
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significantly. They can, for example, perform the key analytical task
of isolating the decision rules from other statements in the relevant
opinions. Law-trained drafters will not be able to answer all the
relevant questions without help from the social science community.
But they can direct empirical researchers to the key questions, and
they can strive, in the interim, to make educated guesses about the
most appropriate jury decision rules.
Though I list them last here, trial judges are the most
important arbiters of those decision rules. Our system accords trial
judges great discretion concerning the structure of the trial. And
though appellate courts state that they will review the legal
sufficiency of the instructions de novo if the issue has been properly
preserved, even then the precise wording of the instruction lies
within the trial judge's discretion. Compared with standard
operating procedure, the techniques proposed here can be demanding
and even risky. They do not decrease the chances of reversal on
appeal. Indeed, in certain instances-as where the judge provides a
substantive response to a jury's question about the instructions, or
where a judge provides guidance on the law's possible application to
the facts of the case-the methods I advocate may lead in some cases
to missteps, including reversible errors. Trial judges who pursue my
suggested approach will unavoidably be conscious of its costs-for
example, when they do extra work in order to implement it, or when
at times they are reversed on appeal because they followed it. But it
is to be hoped that they will also experience its benefits, in the form
of greater jury understanding and improved jury decision making.
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